

Technical Report 525

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
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FIELD SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS IN ARMY UNIT TRAINING, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FIELDING AND TRAINING WITH THE MILES

Volume II—Appendixes

Cynthia Roberts-Gray, E.R. Clovis, Thomas Gray,
T.H. Muller, and R.F. Cunningham
Perceptronics, Inc.

ARI FIELD UNIT AT PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

September 1981

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Volume II—Appendixes

Cynthia Roberts-Gray, E.R. Clovis, Thomas Gray,
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Perceptronics, Inc.

Submitted by:
James A. Thomas, Chief
ARI FIELD UNIT AT PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

Approved by:

E. Ralph Dusek, Director
TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY

**U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333**

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Individual Training and
Combat Unit Training

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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This research was conducted under the technical monitorship of Dr. James Banks, ARI Field Unit, Presidio of Monterey, California.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Survey, unit training, tactical engagement simulation, training technology transfer, training environment, operational context, training management, conduct of training, REALTRAIN, armor training, infantry training, combined arms training.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) A survey of CONUS active infantry and armored divisions was conducted: (1) to determine how they actually manage, prepare, and conduct unit tactical training, (2) to describe the operational environment into which training must be fitted and (3) to find out why REALTRAIN/SCOPES has not been more widely used. A large amount of relevant information was gathered and is tabulated in the report. Among the findings was evidence that: training frequently loses out in the competition for time and resources.		

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to nontraining demands made by higher headquarters; decentralization of training is not working as conceived; qualified trainers, particularly NCOs, are in critically short supply, and even these are often diverted to non-training functions having higher ~~real~~ priorities than does training; REALTRAIN/SCOPEs is rarely used because they are thought to require too many assets and too much effort, given the perceived ~~real~~ priority of training. Many other findings are included. The significance of the findings for the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) program is discussed.

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JOSEPH ZEIDNER
Technical Director

FRANKLIN A. HART
Colonel, US Army
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
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FOREWORD

The U. S. Army has long recognized the need to provide high quality training for its units. Attempts to satisfy this need have led to the development of a wide variety of training devices and methods, and extensive training guidance and materials. Although training developers have responded in most cases to real unit training needs and many high quality training products have been introduced, development and introduction have been on an item-by-item basis without an overall strategy that considers needs, priorities, and resources. Too little attention has been paid to the "environmental fit" of the products. Consequently, acceptance and use of new training developments have frequently been less than was expected and less than is desirable.

MILES Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) is a new development which has the potential for radically improving tactical training and evaluation. As no training development--no matter how promising--can produce its intended benefits if it is not used, the research described in this report was conducted to determine how factors in the training environment might support or degrade effective use of TES systems. The results have been used by TRADOC training developers in planning for fielding of MILES-TES, and in briefings for MACOM Commander on requirements for field support of MILES-TES. The results are also broadly useful to training researchers and developers concerned with conditions affecting acceptance and use of their products.

JOSEPH ZEIDNER
Technical Director

CONTENTS

APPENDIX A - DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

B - SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

C - DATA TABLES AND SUMMARIES

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Brief Biographical Information for Survey Respondents

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
A	G3	LTC	9	1959	--
B	G3	LTC	8	1961	--
C	G3	LTC	33	1957	--
D	G3	LTC	10	--	Plt Ldr, XO Armd Cav Troop, Co Comdr Armd Cav, Bn Comdr Tank
<u>Armor</u>					
A	Bde Comdr	COL	12	1957	Bn Comdr, Bde S3, Bde XO, Bn XO, Bn S3, Comdr Rifle Co, Comdr Airborne Co, Comdr Mecz Rifle Co, Special Forces
B	Bde Comdr	COL	4	1955	Plt Ldr Airborne, Plt Ldr Transp, Plt Ldr Mecz Inf, S3, XO Mecz Bn, Comdr Mecz Inf Bn
C	Bde Comdr	COL	7	1956	Plt Ldr, Co XO, Hq Co Comdr, Bn Comdr, G3 Plans Officer
D	Bde Comdr	COL	11	1955	Plt Ldr, Co XO, Co Comdr, Bn Comdr, Div G-1

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
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Infantry

A	Bde Comdr	COL	11	1957	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Bn S3, Bde S3, Bn CO
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B	Bde Comdr	COL	3	1957	Plt Ldr, XO, Co Comdr, Bn Comdr Bde XO, Bde S3
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C	Bde Comdr	COL	4	1957	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr Inf, Bn Co Bde XO, Co XO, Bn S3, Bde S3 Div G-3
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D	Bde Comdr	COL	9	1957	Plt Ldr Inf, Co Comdr Inf, Bn Comdr Mecz Bn, Bde XO, Bn S3, Corp Asst G3
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Armor

A	Bde S3	MAJ	6	1963	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co XO
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B	Bde S3	MAJ	4	1965	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co XO, Bn XO
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C	Bde S3	MAJ	1/4	1967	--
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D	Bde S3	MAJ	3	1956	Co Comdr, Co XO, Bn S3
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<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Bde S3	MAJ	1	1963	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co X0, Bn S3

B	Bde S3	CAPT	10	1965	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Bn S3

C	Bde S3	MAJ	3/4	1965	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Bn S3

D	Bde S3	MAJ	10	1965	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co X0, Bn S3

<u>Armor</u>					
A	Bn Comdr	LTC	10	1960	All normal commands + Bn S3 and Bn X0

B	Bn Comdr	LTC	10	1961	Plt Ldr, Co X0, Troop Comdr, Sqdn S3, Bde S-4, Div Asst G4

C	Bn Comdr	LTC	2	1958	Plt Ldr, Co X0, Co Comdr, Bn X0, Bde Bn Comdr

D	Bn Comdr	LTC	11	1962	Co Comdr, Co X0, Bn X0, Bn S3, Regt S

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Bn Comdr	LTC	22	1959	Inf Plt Ldr, X0 Rifle Co, Bn S3, Wpn Plt Ldr, 4 Rifle Companies
B	Bn Comdr	LTC	1/2	1962	Plt Ldr, Co X0, Co Comdr, Asst S3, Bn S3 Bde S3, G3 Plan/Ops, DCSOPS Europe
C	Bn Comdr	LTC	15	1962	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Bn S3, Bn X0, Div G3 Section
D	Bn Comdr	LTC	10	1957	--
<u>Armor</u>					
A	Bn S3	MAJ	15	1966	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co X0, Bde S3
B	Bn S3	(No response)			
C	Bn S3	CAPT	2	1969	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co X0, Bde S3, Div Plans Officer
D	Bn S3	MAJ	5	1965	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Bde S3, Div G3 Section

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Bn S3	CAPT	3	1973	--

B	Bn S3	MAJ	6	1964	Co Comdr, Bn X0

C	Bn S3	CAPT	1	1963	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr, Co X0

D	Bn S3	MAJ	8	1968	Plt Ldr, Co Comdr

<u>Armor</u>					
A	Bn OPS NCO	E7	18	1967	Plt Ldr, Bn S3 Section, Bde S3 Section, Div S3 Section

B	Bn OPS NCO	E7	15	1962	Bn S3 Section

C	Bn OPS NCO	E7	19	1965	Plt Sgt, Plt Ldr, Bn S3 Section

D	Bn OPS NCO	E7	32	--	Bn S3 Section

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Bn OPS NCO	E7	31	1961	Bn S3 Section

B	Bn OPS NCO	E8	23	1960	Bn S3 Section

C	Bn OPS NCO	E7	16	1960	Bn S3 Section

D	Bn OPS NCO	E7	32	1961	Bn S3 Section

<u>Armor</u>					
A	Co Comdr	CAPT	1	1973	Plt Ldr, Co X0, Bn S3, Tank Gunnery Officer

B	Co Comdr	CAPT	8	1974	Asst ADP Officer, Spt Plt Ldr, Armd Cav Sqn, Cav Plt Ldr, Asst. Adj

C	Co Comdr	CAPT	11	1972	--

D	Co Comdr	CAPT	3/4	1972	Plt Ldr, Co X0

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Co Comdr	2LT	1/4	1978	ROTC, RA Commission in MI

B	Co Comdr	1LT	20	1976	Asst Pers Off, Plt Ldr Mecz, XO Mecz Inf Rifle Co, Sct Plt

C	Co Comdr	CAPT	8	1974	Plt Ldr Inf, Co XO Inf, Plt Ldr Ranger, Co XO Ranger Co

D	Co Comdr	CAPT	5	1971	Plt Ldr, Co XO, S3 Air, SF Det Comdr

<u>Armor</u>					
A	Co Trng NCO	E5	1	1975	Tk Comdr, Decon Tn Ldr, Det Tm Ldr

B	Co Trng NCO	E2	1	1978	--

C	Co Trng NCO	E4	1	1968	Fire Team Ldr

D	Co Trng NCO	E5	8	1976	Asst Tank Comdr

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Co Trng NCO		(None)		

B	Co Trng NCO		(None)		

C	Co Trng NCO	E5	6	1977	Asst TC, Sqd Ldr, Sr Gnr

D	Co Trng NCO		(None)		

<u>Armor</u>					
A	Plt Ldr	2LT	8	1978	--

B	Plt Ldr	2LT	12	1976	Eng

C	Plt Ldr	1LT	1	1976	Co XO

D	Plt Ldr	2LT	10	1977	Asst Tng O

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>	<u>Duty Positions Previously Held</u>
<u>Infantry</u>					
A	Plt Ldr	2LT	8	1978	Fire Team Ldr, Sqd Ldr, Sec Ldr Bde leve

B	Plt Ldr	2LT	3	1978	--

C	Plt Ldr	2LT	11	1977	--

D	Plt Ldr	1LT	10	1966	Rifle Co XO

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
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Armor

A	Plt Sgt	E7	2	1965
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B	Plt Sgt	E7	40	1958
---	---------	----	----	------

C	Plt Sgt	E7	2	1962
---	---------	----	---	------

D	Plt Sgt	E7	60	1965
---	---------	----	----	------

Infantry

A	Plt Sgt	E6	8	1969
---	---------	----	---	------

B	Plt Sgt	E7	21	1966
---	---------	----	----	------

C	Plt Sgt	E7	50	1964
---	---------	----	----	------

D	Plt Sgt	E6	1	1971
---	---------	----	---	------

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
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Armor

A	Tank Comdr	E5	1/4	1975
	Tank Comdr	E5	42	1976

B	Tank Comdr	E5	6	1975
	Tank Comdr	E5	29	1976

C	Tank Comdr	E5	24	1969
	Tank Comdr		(No response)	

D	Tank Comdr	E5	7	1976
	Tank Comdr	E5	2	1976

Infantry

A	Sqd Ldr	E4	5	1976
	Sqd Ldr	E5	45	1975

B	Sqd Ldr	E5	18	1970
	Sqd Ldr	E5	19	1970

C	Sqd Ldr	E5	18	1974
	Sqd Ldr	E5	15	1972

D	Sqd Ldr	E4	--	1971
	Sqd Ldr	E4	24	1976

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
<u>Armor</u>				
A	Tank Comdr	SGT	43	1972
	Tank Comdr	E5	3	1975
	Tank Comdr	E5	5	1975
	Gunner	E4	3	1975
	Driver	SP/4	31	1976
	Armor Crewman	E4	24	1976
	Driver	E4	24	1976
	Gunner	E4	17	1977
	Gunner	E3	12	1977
	Gunner	E3	18	1976
	Track Driver	E3	34	1976
	Driver	E2	1	1978
	Loader	E2	5	1978
	Driver	E2	3	1978
	Loader	E1	1	1978

B

Tank Comdr	E5	6	1975
Driver	E5	33	1976
Driver	E5	29	1976
Driver	SP/4	22	1976
Driver	E4	1	1976
Gunner	E4	1	1977
Driver	E4	16	1977
Driver	E4	13	1976
Tank Loader	E3	11	1978
Driver	E3	11	1978
Driver	E3	17	1977
Loader	E3	16	1977
Driver	E3	20	1977
Gunner/Loader	E1	1	1978

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
C	Tank Comdr	E6	22	1966
	Tank Comdr	E6	19	1975
	Gunner	E5	18	1977
	Tank Comdr/ Gunner	E5	19	1975
	Tank Comdr	E5	5	1975
	Tank Comdr	E5	2	1975
	Gunner	E5	24	1977
	Driver	E4	11	1978
	Driver	E4	20	1977
	Tank Gunner	E4	24	1975
	Driver	E4	18	1977
	Tank Gunner	E4	10	1977
	Driver	E3	10	1978

D	Tank Comdr	E5	7	1976
	Tank Comdr/ Gunner	E5	2	1976
	Gunner	E4	4	1976
	Tank Comdr	E4	7	1976
	Gunner	E4	4	1976
	Driver	E3	2	1976
	Loader	E3	8	1978
	Driver	E2	4	1978
	Driver	E2	4	1978
	Gunner	E2	6	1978
	Driver	E2	-	1976
	Loader/Driver	E2	4	1978
	Gunner	E2	3	1978
	Driver	E1	11	1978
	Loader	E1	1	1978

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
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Infantry

A

Sqd Ldr	E5	45	1975
Asst Sqd Ldr	E5	5	1976
Rifleman	E4	18	1977
Rifleman	E4	--	1975
Rifleman	E4	7	1979
Track Driver	E4	23	1977
Driver	E4	32	1976
TOW Personnel	SP4	41	1975
Gunner	E3	14	1977
Track Driver	E3	4	1978
Grenadier	E3	10	1977
Track Driver	E3	24	1976
Driver	E3	13	1976
Infantryman	E3	28	1976
Rifleman	E3	1	1974
Rifleman	E2	12	1978
Driver (APC)	E2	10	1978
Gunner	E2	5	1978
Rifleman	E1	5	1978
Rifleman	--	--	---
Rifleman	--	--	---

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
B	Sqd Ldr	E5	18	1970
	Sqd Ldr	E5	19	1975
	Team Ldr	E5	1	1973
	Gunner	E4	18	1976
	Team Ldr	E4	7	1972
	Mortar Carrier Drvr	E3	1	1977
	Jeep Driver	E3	14	1977
	Mortarman	E2	20	1979
	Gunner	E2	3	1976
	Rifleman	E2	4	1976
	Gunner	E2	6	1978
	Grenadier	E2	--	1978
	Rifleman	E2	--	1978
	Rifleman	E2	5	1978
	Gunner	E2	6	1978
	Mortar Carrier Drvr	E2	--	1978
	Rifleman	E2	9	1978
	Personnel Carrier Drvr	E2	16	--
	Rifleman	E2	26	1977
	Rifleman	E2	--	--
	Track Driver	E1	1	1978
	Ammo Bearer	E1	12	1974

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
C	Team Ldr	E5	18	1974
	Sqd Ldr	E5	5	1975
	Sqd Ldr	E5	15	1972
	Sqd Ldr	E5	10	1972
	Gunner	E4	2	1977
	Team Ldr	E4	43	1975
	Rifleman	E4	24	1977
	Fire Tm Ldr	E4	12	1976
	Team Ldr	E4	--	1977
	Rifleman	E4	19	1977
	Rifleman	E4	19	--
	Rifleman	E3	9	1977
	Rifleman	E3	5	1978
	Rifleman	E3	11	1977
	Rifleman	E3	--	1977
	Rifleman	E3	7	1978
	Rifleman	E2	7	1978
	Rifleman	E2	4	1978
	Rifleman	E2	2	1978
	Rifleman	E2	6	1978
	Rifleman	E2	9	1978
	Sqd Ldr	E2	1	1978
	Rifleman	E2	1	1978
	Rifleman	E2	5	1978
<hr/>				
D	Sqd Ldr	E5	60	1974
	Grenadier	E4	18	1976
	Rifleman	E4	34	1976
	Sqd Ldr	SP/4	72	1971
	Rifleman	E4	29	1976
	Team Ldr	E4	6	1976
	Rifleman	E4	31	1976

<u>Division</u>	<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Months in Present Assignment</u>	<u>Date of Entry in Service</u>
D				
	Rifleman	E4	30	1976
	Gunner	E4	30	1976
	Driver	E4	30	1976
	Rifleman	E4	16	1976
	Driver	E4	24	1976
	Radio Operator	E4	42	1975
	Rifleman	E3	24	1972
	TOW Gunner	E3	10	1977
	Rifleman	E3	30	1976
	Gunner	E3		1978
	Rifleman	E3	15	1977
	Fire Tm Leader	E2	--	1978
	Gunner	E1	1	1976
	Gunner	E1	1	1978

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Item	Target Respondents							
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt
00 Do you have a training cadre to assist units in conducting training? If so, how many people are in it?	*							
01 Do you have an evaluation section to conduct evaluations of training in your organization? If so, how many people are in the section?	*							
03 Do you have a cadre or section that could take responsibility for managing the employment of MILES in your division? If so, who?	*							
04 To what extent is each of the following an obstacle to your developing better small unit training: Lack of training in small unit training techniques? Lack of expertise about specific subject matter (e.g., weapons, land navigation)? Lack of knowledge about what standards of performance to expect in small unit training? Lack of familiarity with the techniques of field training in general, including the use of field expedients?								
06 What do you think of REALTRAIN/SCOPES as a training method? Why? Why isn't it used (more) in your organization?	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
09 What kind of training can't be conducted at present?	*	*	*					

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
10 What do you think of the National Training Center idea?	*	*	*	*	*					
15 Would MILES help your unit do better training? How? How would MILES be better than REALTRAIN or SCOPES? How would MILES be better than non-ES FTXs?	*	*	*	*	*	*	*			
16 What problems do you expect with MILES?	*	*	*	*	*	*	*			
17 What kind of formal instruction in how to train have you received? Where? How good was it? How could it be improved?										
18 How can training of trainers be improved?			*	*	*	*		*	*	*
19 What do you do to expand upon or supplement ARTEPs as published?	*		*	*	*	*				
21 How could published ARTEPs be improved?	*	*	*	*	*	*				
41 What problems are peculiar to training the combat support company?				*	*					
44 In the Division, what is the current state of Operational Readiness Training? Unit Training? Individual Training?	*	*		*		*				
45 How much freedom do you have to decide the training your unit needs and then to see it's carried out? To what extent do you exercise this freedom?		*		*		*	*			

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
46 Does the type of unit you have make it unusually in demand for supporting the training of other units? Does your training have any unusual support requirements?				*		*				
47 As a training manager, what are your major problem areas?		*		*	*	*				
48 As a trainer, what are your major problem areas?							*	*	*	*
49 How do you establish priorities between training and non-training missions? How do these priorities affect assignment of training time, training resources, and other training support to subordinate units?	*									
50 Are there any particular problems for a unit in transitioning from one cycle to the next?	*		*		*					
57 When unit training deficiencies are diagnosed by evaluators in an external ARTEP, how is the evaluated unit informed of what these are? How long does it take to get this information to the unit?	*		*			*				
58 When units are informed by higher HQ of training deficiencies, ordinarily how detailed are the instructions given by the higher HQ on how to correct the deficiencies? Does this allow too much or too little freedom to the unit leader in deciding what training should be done?	*				*	*				*

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
59 In your organization how often is REALTRAIN/SCOPES used in training and/or evaluations? At what level?			*							
68 Do your subordinate units very often feel there are more requirements laid on them than they can handle? How do you find out? What do you do?	*	*		*						
69 When is individual training supposed to take place according to policy? How well does this work in practice?	*		*		*	*				
70 What do you do when you find it is impossible to meet all the requirements laid on you by higher HQ?		*		*		*				
71 Compared with those of 7 or 8 years ago, in your opinion how do today NCOs and junior officers rate on the following characteristics: Professional knowledge? Initiative? Dependability? Leadership?	*	*		*						
72 What does a training day cost on the average?	*									
73 What does a battalion external ARTEP cost?	*									
74 In supporting the training of others, does a unit receive any worthwhile tactical training itself? How much? Could this be improved? How?	*		*		*					

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
75 Are training objectives, scenarios, and support plans for FTX's and evaluations retained as a matter of record? Can we get a representative sample of them?					*					
76 At what level of training should a unit be before introduction to engagement simulation methods?			*		*	*				
77 How do requirements to comply with environmental, cultural and energy restrictions affect your ability to train?	*		*		*					
78 How detailed and specific are diagnosis of your unit's training deficiencies when made by others (for instance, by ARTEP evaluators)?					*	*	*			
81 In practice, how serious a problem is mission turbulence in your organization? What are its most undesirable effects?		*	*	*	*	*				
82 How much of a battalion's schedule as it stands at the start of a green cycle can the battalion expect to accomplish without major revisions? What causes changes?			*	*	*					
83 How closely does your organization manning agree with your TO&E by strength and grade?				*		*				

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
84 What kinds of problems do personnel turbulence among the following groups cause you: Officers? NCOs? Other E.M.?	*	*	*	*	*	*				
85 Following are five factors that can have adverse effects on morale and career intentions: Too much guidance; Conflicting priorities at different levels of command; Uncertainty due to frequent changes in goals and missions. How serious do you think each of these is for officers? NCOs? Other E.M.?		*		*		*	*	*		
86 Where does your training guidance come from and what does it usually consist of? How good is it?				*		*	*			
90 What changes would you like to see in the way training is planned, supported, and conducted?		*	*	*	*	*	*			
91 Is there a conflict between training budget (\$) and training requirements? If so, how is this resolved?	*		*							
93 When a unit finds itself with a previously unscheduled opportunity to conduct field training during a red or amber cycle, what steps must it take to obtain training areas or ranges? Ammunition? POL?			*		*	*				

Item	Target Respondents									
	G-3	Bde Comdr	Bde S-3	Bn Comdr	Bn S-3	Co Comdr	Plt Ldr	Plt Sgt	Sqd Ldr	Crew Comdr
94 How is a battalion external ARTEP managed?	*									
95 In preparing your organization's master training calendar, how do the planning factors differ for the different types of maneuver arms elements?	*									
96 How well do current Army publications (FMs, TCs, "How to Fight" manuals) serve company grade officers as sources of doctrine and guidance?		*		*			*			
97 How much time should be scheduled for a battalion external ARTEP? A company external ARTEP? A platoon external ARTEP?	*		*		*					

TRAINING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

The United States Army Research Institute (ARI) has a continuing program aimed at producing practical solutions to problems combat arms trainers and training managers meet in the field every day. In order to help develop realistic solutions, ARI must have a realistic understanding of the actual problems and the conditions that give rise to them.

This questionnaire is part of a larger survey that will help answer three broad questions:

- o How do you train?
- o What are your problems?
- o What causes your problems?

If you feel we have overlooked important matters bearing on these questions, please write your additional comments on the backs of the questionnaire sheets.

The questionnaire has been made as straightforward as possible. Usually the questions can be answered by checking one or more boxes. A few questions ask you to write in your answers.

Because it is absolutely necessary that we know your answers are given freely and honestly, we have established the firm rule that completed questionnaires will be held in the strictest confidence within the ARI research group. No individual's questionnaire will be made available to anyone (including your military superiors) outside of the research group. In ARI's report of the results of this survey, no individual respondents will be identified or identifiable.

Notes:

1. In this Questionnaire, "Cycle" refers to the training management concept of rotating unit missions. Different organizations use different terms, some of which are listed below, to designate the three types of cycle commonly in use. Please enter the name your Division uses for each cycle in the appropriate space below.

Green = Training = Max Pace = X = _____ in this division

Mostly or entirely prime training time. Emphasis on maximizing the number of persons available for training.

Amber = Mission = Y = _____ in this division

Contingency missions, external ARTEPs, training support missions commonly scheduled for this cycle.

Red = Post Support = Maintenance and Support = Z = _____
in this division

First priority is post support. Training may take place but only as opportunity arises.

2. Use of male gender parts of speech is not meant to exclude females.

GRADE _____ BRANCH _____

UNIT _____ POST _____

PRESENT DUTY POSITION _____

MONTHS IN PRESENT ASSIGNMENT _____

DATE OF ENTRY IN SERVICE _____

PLEASE ENTER THE NUMBER OF MONTHS THAT YOU HAVE SERVED IN ANY OF THE APPLICABLE BLOCKS BELOW; FOR INSTANCE, IF YOU HAD SERVED FOR 18 MONTHS IN THE S-3 SECTION AT BATTALION LEVEL, YOU WOULD ENTER THE NUMBER 18 IN ROW 3, COLUMN 3. PLEASE FILL IN ALL BLOCKS THAT APPLY TO YOU.

	CDR OR LEADER	XO	S-3/G-3 SECTION
PLATOON			
COMPANY			
BATTALION			
BRIGADE			
DIVISION			

1. How much do you depend on each of the following to determine the state of a subordinate unit's training?

	very much	much	little	very little
a. ARTEP evaluation results	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. qualification test results	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. personal observation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. conference with subordinate leaders. .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. other (specify) _____				

2. Consider the present tactical performance capabilities of the maneuver arms platoons in your organization. What percentage of the platoons would you place in each of the following categories? (Total should equal 100%)

Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good

3. In your unit, what is the current state of training in the following general areas:

	Excellent	Adequate	Inadequate
a. Operational Readiness Training . .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Unit Training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Individual Training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Q1-1)

4. In your unit, what is the current state of training in the following subject areas:

	Excellent	Adequate	Inadequate
a. Tactics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Weapons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Maintenance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Communication	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. To what extent is each of the following a reason why there is not better unit training? (Check one box for each line.)

	A Major Cause	A Serious Cause	A Minor Cause	Not A Factor	Don't Know
a. Insufficient priority set by higher HQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Lack of interest by immediate superiors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Lack of interest by subordinates.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Personnel turnover	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Lack of adequate budget	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Lack of knowledge about exactly what changes to make	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Inadequate manning levels	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Lack of imagination among junior personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. Inadequate qualification of junior personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Listed below are a number of missions or problem areas a typical unit might have to deal with in a three month period.

o First, use Column A to indicate the importance you believe your superiors attach to these missions/problems. Indicate the degree of importance by entering the appropriate number from the 5-point scale below.

o Second, use Column B to indicate the importance that you believe should be attached to these missions/problems.

5	4	3	2	1
Very High Importance	Above Average Importance	Average Importance	Below Average Importance	Very Low Importance

<u>Mission or Problem Area</u>	COLUMN A	COLUMN B
	<u>How Important To Your Superiors</u>	<u>How Important In Your View</u>
a. Drug Abuse Control	_____	_____
b. Community Relations	_____	_____
c. Race Relations	_____	_____
d. Small Unit Training	_____	_____
e. Command Inspections	_____	_____
f. Operational Missions	_____	_____
g. Vehicular Maintenance	_____	_____
h. Administration	_____	_____
i. SQT Training	_____	_____

(Q1-3)

7. In your opinion, how do today's NCOs and company grade officers compare with those of 7 or 8 years ago in the following characteristics?

Enter one of the following numbers in each block:

1
today's
are better

2
today's are
about the same

3
today's are
not as good

Characteristic	Company Grade Officers	NCOs E9-E7	NCOs E6-E4
Professional Knowledge			
Initiative			
Dependability			
Leadership			

8. How well can today's crew commanders and squad leaders conduct squad and crew training:

very well
☐

moderately well
☐

poorly
☐

very poorly
☐

9. How well does today's young soldier learn and remember:

	very well	moderately well	poorly	very poorly
a. Individual Skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Collective Skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. SQT training develops some individual skills that contribute to unit proficiency; but SQT training and collective training compete to some extent for training time and resources. In terms of unit proficiency, does SQT training add more than it takes away?

Yes ☐

No ☐

11. How often is each of the following facilities available to your organization when needed for training?

	Almost Never	Sometimes But Not Often Enough	Usually	Always
a. Weapons Ranges	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Areas for Individual Training.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Areas for Small Unit Training.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Classrooms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. General Field Training Areas .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. What percentages of prime training time is a company likely to spend in each of these activities?

Preparing for collective training _____ %

Conducting collective training,
including ARTEPs _____ %

Non-training activities _____ %

13. About what percentage of a company's time is spent on unscheduled (short-notice) support demands in the three cycles?

Your Division's Cycle Names	
	%
	%
	%

14. On the average, how many days per cycle will the following types of units conduct separate training during each of the three different

Rifle squad/tank crew

Rifle platoon/tank platoon

Rifle company/tank company

Company team

Your Division's Cycle Names		

15. How much does preparation for external ARTEPs govern planning of field training?

- Not at all ☐
- A small amount ☐
- A moderate amount ☐
- A great amount ☐
- Entirely ☐

16. If specific training deficiencies are identified during an external ARTEP, do circumstances (time, resources) provide the unit opportunity to conduct prompt remedial field training?

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Usually | Sometimes | Seldom | Never |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

17. How well do current Army publications (FMs, TCs, "How-to-Fight" Manuals) serve company grade officers as sources of doctrine and guidance?

- They are completely adequate ☐
- They are good but must be supplemented somewhat ☐
- They require a great deal of supplementation ☐
- On the whole, they are almost useless ☐

18. How effective do you think REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises are for each of the following:

	Very Poor	Poor	Good	Very Good
a. improving individual combat skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. making soldiers want to train	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. finding out what training a unit needs most	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. improving unit tactical performance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

19. In your organization, how often is REALTRAIN/SCOPES used in training and/or evaluation at each of the following levels:

	Never	Occasionally	Frequently
a. squad/crew	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. platoon	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. reinforced platoon	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

20. If REALTRAIN/SCOPES is used, is its use:

Required by directive? ☐

Optional with the unit? ☐

(Q1-8)

21. Compared with other field training methods, how hard is it to run a REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercise?

- Much harder ☐
- Somewhat harder ☐
- About the same ☐
- Somewhat easier ☐
- Much easier ☐
- Don't know ☐

22. Have you ever been personally involved in planning and preparation for REALTRAIN or SCOPES field exercises?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(If your answer is "No," proceed directly to Question 26.)

23. Compared with other unit training methods, how difficult is it to plan and prepare for a REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercise?

- Much more difficult ☐
- Somewhat more difficult ☐
- About the same ☐
- Somewhat less difficult ☐
- Much less difficult ☐

24. Expanding on the previous question, which if any of the following factors are sources of special difficulty in planning and preparing for REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises? (Check as many as apply.)

- a. Availability of suitable field training areas ☐
- b. Availability of REALTRAIN/SCOPES equipment ☐
- c. Availability of radios ☐
- d. Availability of ammunition and/or pyrotechnics ☐
- e. Availability of persons to serve as controllers ☐
- f. Training controllers ☐
- g. Training After Action Review leaders ☐
- h. Choosing appropriate missions ☐
- i. Writing appropriate scenarios and supporting documents (e.g., operations orders) ☐
- j. Deciding how much freedom of tactical action to allow one side or the other ☐
- k. Training REALTRAIN/SCOPES radio control net personnel ☐
- l. Other (please describe) _____

25. Where did you learn to plan and prepare REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises?
(Check as many as apply.)

Never learned ☐

Service School ☐

TRADOC's REALTRAIN Mobile Training Team ☐

Doctrinal publications (TCs, FMs) ☐

Video tapes ☐

By working with someone who knew how ☐

Other (please describe) _____

26. For items you checked above (except "Never learned"), indicate how good the guidance/instruction was.

	Very Good	Good	Poor	Very Poor
a. Service School	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. TRADOC's REALTRAIN Mobile Training Team	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Doctrinal publications (TCs, FMs)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Video tapes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Working with someone who knew how	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Other (as you described above)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9 April 1979

TRAINING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

The United States Army Research Institute (ARI) has a continuing program aimed at producing practical solutions to problems combat arms trainers and training managers meet in the field every day. In order to help develop realistic solutions, ARI must have a realistic understanding of the actual problems and the conditions that give rise to them.

This questionnaire is part of a larger survey that will help answer three broad questions:

- o How do you train?
- o What are your problems?
- o What causes your problems?

If you feel we have overlooked important matters bearing on these questions, please write your additional comments on the backs of the questionnaire sheets.

The questionnaire has been made as straightforward as possible. Usually the questions can be answered by checking one or more boxes. A few questions ask you to write in your answers.

Because it is absolutely necessary that we know your answers are given freely and honestly, we have established the firm rule that completed questionnaires will be held in the strictest confidence within the ARI research group. No individual's questionnaire will be made available to anyone (including your military superiors) outside of the research group. In ARI's report of the results of this survey, no individual respondents will be identified or identifiable.

Notes:

1. In this Questionnaire, "Cycle" refers to the training management concept of rotating unit missions. Different organizations use different terms, some of which are listed below, to designate the three types of cycle commonly in use. Please enter the name your Division uses for each cycle in the appropriate space below.

Green = Training = Max Pace = X = _____ in this division

Mostly or entirely prime training time. Emphasis on maximizing the number of persons available for training.

Amber = Mission = Y = _____ in this division

Contingency missions, external ARTEPs, training support missions commonly scheduled for this cycle.

Red = Post Support = Maintenance and Support = Z = _____
in this division

First priority is post support. Training may take place but only as opportunity arises.

2. Use of male gender parts of speech is not meant to exclude females.

GRADE _____ BRANCH (OR MOS) _____

UNIT _____ POST _____

PRESENT DUTY POSITION _____

MONTHS IN PRESENT ASSIGNMENT _____

DATE OF ENTRY (ACTIVE DUTY) _____

PLEASE LIST PREVIOUS LEADERSHIP DUTY POSITIONS (FOR INSTANCE,
FIRE TEAM LEADER, TANK COMMANDER, SQUAD LEADER, ETC.) YOU HAVE HELD
IN COMBAT ARMS UNITS. SHOW THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME YOU HELD
EACH.

1. How much do you depend on each of the following to determine the state of training of squads or crews?

	very much	much	little	very little
a. ARTEP evaluation results	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. qualification test results	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. personal observation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. conference with squad or crew leaders.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. other (specify) _____				

2. If specific training deficiencies are identified during an external ARTEP, do local circumstances (time and resources) provide the unit opportunity to conduct prompt remedial field training?

Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. In your unit, what is the current state of training in the following subject areas:

	Excellent	Adequate	Inadequate
a. Tactics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Weapons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Maintenance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Communication	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. To what extent is each of the following a reason why there is not better unit training? (Check one box for each line.)

	A Major Cause	A Serious Cause	A Minor Cause	Not A Factor	Don't Know
a. Insufficient priority set by higher HQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Lack of interest by immediate superiors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Lack of interest by subordinates.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Personnel turnover	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Lack of adequate budget	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Lack of knowledge about exactly what changes to make	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Inadequate manning levels	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Lack of imagination among junior personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. Inadequate qualification of junior personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. Listed below are a number of missions or problem areas a typical unit might have to deal with in a three month period.

o First, use Column A to indicate the importance you believe your superiors attach to these missions/problems. Indicate the degree of importance by entering the appropriate number from the 5-point scale below.

o Second, use Column B to indicate the importance that you believe should be attached to these missions/problems.

5	4	3	2	1
Very High Importance	Above Average Importance	Average Importance	Below Average Importance	Very Low Importance

<u>Mission or Problem Area</u>	COLUMN A	COLUMN B
	<u>How Important To Your Superiors</u>	<u>How Important In Your View</u>
a. Drug Abuse Control	_____	_____
b. Community Relations	_____	_____
c. Race Relations	_____	_____
d. Small Unit Training	_____	_____
e. Command Inspections	_____	_____
f. Operational Missions	_____	_____
g. Vehicular Maintenance	_____	_____
h. Administration	_____	_____
i. SQT Training	_____	_____

6. SQT training develops some individual skills that contribute to unit proficiency; but SQT training and collective training compete to some extent for training time and resources. In terms of unit proficiency, does SQT training add more than it takes away?

Yes ☐

No ☐

7. As a small unit trainer, do you feel you need more guidance in:

	Yes	No
a. Small unit training techniques	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Specific subject matter (for instance, weapons, use of terrain, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Standards of performance to expect in small unit training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Techniques of field training in general, including use of field expedients	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

8. How well can today's crew commanders/squad leaders conduct squad and crew training:

very well

☐

moderately well

☐

poorly

☐

very poorly

☐

9. How well does today's young soldier learn and remember:

	very well	moderately well	poorly	very poorly
a. Individual Skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Collective Skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. On the average, how many days per cycle will the following types of units conduct separate training during each of the three different types of cycles?

Rifle squad/tank crew
Rifle platoon/tank platoon
Rifle company/tank company
Company team

Your Division's Cycle Names		

11. How often can you expect field visits from senior commanders and staff during a prime-time field training period of one week or longer?

Never	<input type="checkbox"/>
Less than once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>
Once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>
Two times a week	<input type="checkbox"/>
Three or four times a week	<input type="checkbox"/>
Daily	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. Are you familiar with REALTRAIN or SCOPES?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(If you answered "Yes," go on to the next question; if you answered "No," you are finished with the questionnaire. Please check your answers before turning it in.)

13. What do you think of REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises for each of the following:

	Very Poor	Poor	Good	Very Good
a. improving individual combat skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. making soldiers want to train	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. finding out what training a unit needs most	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. improving unit tactical performance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. Compared with other field training methods, how hard is it to run a REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercise?

Much harder ☐

Somewhat harder ☐

About the same ☐

Somewhat easier ☐

Much easier ☐

Don't know ☐

15. Have you ever been personally involved in planning and preparation for REALTRAIN or SCOPES field exercises?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(If your answer is "No," proceed directly to Question 18.)

16. Compared with other unit training methods, how difficult is it to plan and prepare for a REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercise?

- Much more difficult ☐
- Somewhat more difficult ☐
- About the same ☐
- Somewhat less difficult ☐
- Much less difficult ☐

17. Which, if any, of the following factors are sources of special difficulty in planning and preparing for REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises? (Check as many as apply.)

- a. Availability of suitable field training areas ☐
- b. Availability of REALTRAIN/SCOPES equipment ☐
- c. Availability of radios ☐
- d. Availability of ammunition and pyrotechnics ☐
- e. Training controllers to conduct exercises ☐
- f. Learning how to conduct After Action Reviews ☐
- g. Choosing appropriate missions ☐
- h. Writing appropriate field orders ☐
- i. Deciding how much freedom of tactical action to allow one side or the other ☐
- j. Training to use REALTRAIN/SCOPES radio control nets ☐
- k. Other (please describe) _____

18. Where did you learn to plan and prepare REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises?
(Check as many as apply.)

Never learned ☐
Service School or BNOC ☐
TRADOC's REALTRAIN Mobile Training Team ☐
Doctrinal publications (TCs, FMs) ☐
Video tapes ☐
Working with someone who knew how ☐
Other (please describe) _____

19. For items you checked above (except "Never learned"), indicate how good the guidance/instruction was.

	Very Good	Good	Poor	Very Poor
a. Service School	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. TRADOC's REALTRAIN Mobile Training Team	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Doctrinal publications (TCs, FMs)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Video tapes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Helping someone who knew how	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Other (as you described above)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9 April 1979

TRAINING SURVEY

Army scientists are looking for ways to make your training better and more interesting to you. To do this, we must find out how you feel about some parts of your training as it is done now. That is why you are asked to fill out this form.

You can answer most of the questions by putting an "X" in a little box -- ☐ -- after you read the question. Some of the questions have two parts. Be sure you answer both parts.

Only the scientists who are studying training will see the forms. The forms will not be shown to your superiors. We have made this a rule, so that you will feel free to give us your honest answers.

GRADE _____ PMOS _____

UNIT _____

PRESENT DUTY POSITION _____

MONTHS IN PRESENT ASSIGNMENT _____

DATE OF ENTRY IN SERVICE _____

PLEASE INDICATE WHERE AND WHEN YOU COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING TRAINING:

BASIC COMBAT TRAINING (BCT) _____
WHERE _____ WHEN _____

ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (AIT) _____
WHERE _____ WHEN _____

OTHER TRAINING (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____
TRAINING _____
WHERE _____ WHEN _____

PLEASE SHOW WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS YOU HAVE HELD:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> RIFLEMAN | <input type="checkbox"/> SECTION LEADER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> GRENADIER | <input type="checkbox"/> SCOUT |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MACHINEGUNNER | <input type="checkbox"/> TANK LOADER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MORTARMAN | <input type="checkbox"/> TRACK DRIVER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> FIRE TEAM LEADER | <input type="checkbox"/> TRACK GUNNER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SQUAD LEADER | <input type="checkbox"/> TRACK COMMANDER |

1. How well trained is your squad or crew as a team?

Very Poorly
Trained

☐

Poorly
Trained

☐

Well
Trained

☐

Very Well
Trained

☐

2. How well trained are you, as an individual?

Very Poorly
Trained

☐

Poorly
Trained

☐

Well
Trained

☐

Very Well
Trained

☐

3. Do you get enough individual training to prepare you for:

Yes No

a. Your SQT?

☐☐

b. Your duties in your squad or crew?

☐☐

4. How much of what you learn in getting ready for your SQT is helpful in your duties as a squad/crew member?

a. Almost all of what I learn helps me in my squad/crew duties ☐

b. Some of what I learn helps me in my squad/crew duties ☐

c. Almost nothing I learn helps me in my squad/crew duties ☐

5. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend in:

	too much time	about the right amount of time	not enough time
a. Individual Training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Unit Tactical Training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Have you yourself ever been in an ARTEP?

Never ☐ Once ☐ A Few Times ☐ Many Times ☐

(If you have never been in an ARTEP, go directly to Question 11.)

7. In your last ARTEP, why do you think your unit was going through the ARTEP? (If there was more than one reason, be sure to show them all.)

- a. to see how good your unit was ☐
- b. to train your unit ☐
- c. to find out what training your unit needed most ☐
- d. don't know ☐

If there was some other reason, tell us what it was.

8. After your last ARTEP, did someone get you all together to tell you what you did well and what you did not do well?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If "yes," did you get a chance to tell about what you did in the ARTEP?

Yes ☐ No ☐

9. How much good training did your squad/crew get in its last ARTEP?

almost none ☐

some ☐

a lot ☐

10. Check what you think of ARTEP for each of the following:

	Very Poor	Poor	Good	Very Good
a. unit training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. individual training	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. seeing how good a unit is	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. finding out what training units need most	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Have you yourself ever been in REALTRAIN or SCOPES exercises?

Never ☐ Once ☐ A Few Times ☐ Many Times ☐

(If you answered "never," you are finished. If you checked any of the other answers, answer the following questions.)

12. Do you like REALTRAIN/SCOPES?

Yes ☐ No ☐

13. Check what you think of REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises for each of the following:

	Very Poor	Poor	Good	Very Good
a. improving individual combat skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. making soldiers want to train	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. finding out what training a unit needs most	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. improving unit tactical performance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. When you were in REALTRAIN/SCOPES exercises, how often did you disagree with the controllers about hits and kills?

Almost Never ☐ Sometimes ☐ Often ☐ Almost Always ☐

15. a. Did someone get the soldiers on both sides together after the exercise so that the soldiers could tell how they were able to make each "kill"?

Yes ☐

No ☐

(If you checked "No," go to Question 16.)

- b. How much do you think this after-action review helped the soldiers learn what they did right and what they did wrong?

Helped a lot ☐

Helped some ☐

Helped very little ☐

16. a. How much does training with REALTRAIN/SCOPES help you learn the skills you will need in combat?

helps
very little
☐

helps
some
☐

helps
very much
☐

- b. Which is better for learning combat skills, field training with REALTRAIN/SCOPES or field training without REALTRAIN/SCOPES?

Training with REALTRAIN/SCOPES is better ☐

One is as good as the other ☐

Training without REALTRAIN/SCOPES is better ☐

17. a. Were you ever a REALTRAIN/SCOPES controller?

Yes ☐

No ☐

b. Did you get controller training that taught you what you needed to know to be a good controller?

I didn't get controller training ☐

I got controller training, but not enough ☐

I got the controller training I needed ☐

APPENDIX C

SURVEY DATA TABLES AND SUMMARIES

PART 1: CONTEXT, MANAGEMENT, AND CONDUCT OF ARMY UNIT TRAINING

PART 2: ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION IN THE OPERATIONAL UNIT

APPENDIX C

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Explanatory Notes	C-1
PART I: CONTEXT, MANAGEMENT, AND CONDUCT OF ARMY UNIT TRAINING	
Policies and Regulations	C-3
Current State of Training	C-21
Command Emphasis	C-49
Resource Availability and Constraints	C-72
Population	C-82
Factors Impacting on Morale and Career Intentions	C-114
Programming Resources and Training Activities	C-132
Establishment of Training Priorities	C-139
Availability, Selection, and Training of Training Support Personnel	C-149
Training the Trainers	C-156
Problems Frequently Encountered in Training Management	C-170
Impact of Personnel Turbulence	C-177
Impact of Mission Turbulence and Diversions from Training	C-188
Type, Amount and Frequency of Tactical Training	C-208
Interface/Interactions of Individual and Collective Training	C-249
User Acceptance/Suggested Revision for ARTEP Tasks, Conditions and Standards	C-258
Manner in which Training Deficiencies/Needs are Identified*	C-280

*"Responsibilities for Training and Evaluation" was a separate topic included in the original list of topics selected for survey. It was not, however, treated as a separate topic in data analysis but was subsumed into the topic entitled "Manner in which Training Deficiencies/Needs are Identified."

Problems Frequently Encountered in Planning, Preparing and Conducting Training	C-299
Impact of Resource Availabilities	C-337
Attitudes Toward Current Training and Requirements for New Training and Evaluation Systems	C-348
PART 2: ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION IN THE OPERATIONAL UNIT	
Utilization of REALTRAIN/SCOPEs Training Methods	C-363
Acceptance of REALTRAIN/SCOPEs Training Methods	C-376
Impact of User Knowledge and Resource Constraints on Utilization of REALTRAIN/SCOPEs	C-396
Attitudes Regarding Future Use of MILES	C-418
Perceived Requirements/Problems MILES Will Produce	C-424

APPENDIX C

DATA TABLES AND SUMMARIES
SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS IN ARMY UNIT TRAINING
CONDUCTED APRIL 1979

Explanation of symbols used:

- The symbols "Q1," "Q2," and "Q3" represent three questionnaires administered as follows: Q1 was completed by Brigade S3s, Battalion S3s, Battalion Operations NCOs and Company Commanders; Q2 was completed by Company Training NCOs, Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants; Q3 was completed by squad members in infantry units and by tank crew members in armor units.
- The symbol "I" is used to refer to interviews conducted with the following individuals: Division G3s (or deputy G3s), Brigade Commanders, Brigade S3s, Battalion Commanders, Battalion S3s, Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Platoon Sergeants, Squad Leaders, and Tank Commanders.
- Specific survey question numbers are referenced by identifying the survey instrument and then giving the item number as shown in the following examples: Q3-17, Q1-8a, or I-47.
- The symbol "n" is used in the tables to represent "no response."
- The symbol "f" is used in the tables to mean "frequency."
- The headings for Division C and D are annotated in the tables with the symbol "+" to indicate that both the armor and the infantry battalions are attached to the brigade which is represented in the column headed "Armor."

- The rows headed "Training NCO" are annotated in the tables with the symbol "++" to indicate that there is no company training NCO for the infantry companies surveyed at Divisions A, B, and D.
- Central tendencies of responses grouped by type of unit (i.e., Armor, Infantry) are figured by excluding responses provided by brigade- and division-level respondents.

PART 1 to APPENDIX C
CONTEXT, MANAGEMENT, AND CONDUCT OF ARMY UNIT TRAINING

Policies and Regulations

Table 1.1 summarizes information shown on the master training calendars used at the four installations surveyed. This information can be further summarized as follows:

1. The period covered by the Master Training Calendar varies at different divisions. At Division A the calendar covers the 72 weeks from March to September. At Divisions B, C, and D the calendar covers a 52-week period. Division B's calendar covers the year from January to December, while Division D schedules a year from April to March, and Division C schedules the year from October to September. (a,b).

2. The calendars show that the X-Y-Z or Red-Amber-Green management concept is being used at all four of the divisions surveyed. Relevant comments from interviewees at Division B, however, show that Division B is abandoning the X-Y-Z management concept. At Division C, on the other hand, the concept is newly adopted. (a).

3. Although the interval of red, amber, and green cycles averaged 5 weeks at Division A, 4 weeks at Division B, 6 weeks at Division C, and 2 weeks at Division D, the most remarkable feature of the cycle durations was that they were so varied. A "cycle" could be of any length from 1 week to 20 weeks. (a).

4. Division FTX and Brigade FTX are shown at least annually on calendars at Divisions A and B. (b).

5. External ARTEPs are annotated on the calendars at Divisions A and B. At Division D external ARTEPs are annotated on the calendar but were not scheduled in the 52 weeks shown for the battalions surveyed. (b).

Table 1.1 Summary of information Shown on the Master Training Calendar

3. Frequency and Duration of Red-Amber-Green Cycles

	Division A (72 weeks, March-September)		Division B (52 weeks, January-December)		Division C (52 weeks, October-September)		Division D (52 weeks, April-March)	
	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn
Red/ Support Cycles	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks
	1	3	1	6	1	4	1	2
	2	4	1	9	1	9	1	3
	3	11	2	15	2	13	3	9
Total		4.2		7.5		6.5		3.0
Mean		3.7		1.0		6.5		3.2
Green/ Prime- Time Cycles	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks
	1	1	2	1	4	1	4	1
	1	3	1	2	3	4	1	2
	1	4	1	13	3	4	1	3
Total		4.0		17		4.0		20
Mean		9.4		4.2		4.0		1.8
Amber Cycles	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks
	2	3	3	1	2	4	7	1
	2	4	2	2	1	18	2	2
	4	14	6	20	3	26	11	22
Total		3.8		3.3		8.7		1.8
Mean		3.5		5.0		8.7		1.6

Table 1.1 Continued

b. Major Events Annotated on Calendar

	Division A (72 weeks, March-September)		Division B (52 weeks, January-December)		Division C (52 weeks, October-September)		Division D (52 weeks, April-March)	
	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn	Armor Bn	Infantry Bn
	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks	f	Duration in weeks
AGI	1	1	1	1			1	1
Divn FTX	1	4	2	1				
Bde FTX			1	1				
External ARTEP	1	4	1	1				
Combined arms live fire	1	1	1	1				
Tank gunnery	4	3-4	1	4	1/1	4/12	1	3
SOT							1	1
Co team live fire							1	1
Small Unit Eval							1	1
Command Post Ex							1	1
EIB	5	1	2	1				
Tank Gunnery			1	1				
Support					1	4	1	2
Reserve Component								
Support							1	1
Career Mgmt Field			1	2				
Guard duty							1	3
Barracks Modern- ization							1	1
Jungle Warfare Trng					1	3		
Total		18		12		23		12
		11						11

Table 1.2 shows responses to a question about the adequacy of current Army publications. These responses can be summarized as follows:

Only a very few (3.2%) of the Q1 respondents indicated that current publications require more than a moderate amount of supplementation. In fact, approximately half (48.4%) of the respondents rated current publications as being completely adequate, with respondents in infantry units providing slightly higher ratings than those provided in armor units. (Q1-17).

Table 1.2

Responses to Question About Current Army Publications

- HOW WELL DO CURRENT ARMY PUBLICATIONS
(FMS, TCS, "HOW-TO-FIGHT" MANUALS)
SERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS AS SOURCES
OF DOCTRINE AND GUIDANCE? (Q1-17).

Response Scale

Almost Useless	Must Be Supplemented a Great Deal	Must Be Supplemented Somewhat	Completely Adequate
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	3.4
Bn S3	3	3		4	3	4	3	4	3.4
Bn Ops NCO	4	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	3.6
Co Comdr	3	4	4	4	3	4	2	3	3.4
<u>Mean</u>	3.2	3.2	3.7	3.5	3.2	4.0	3.2	3.5	
<u>Mean</u>	3.2		3.6		3.6		3.4		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.3	3.7

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	0	1	15	15	0

Table 1.3 shows interview comments regarding training policies and training guidance. These comments can be summarized as follows:

1. Most (85.7%) of the battalion commanders, company commanders, and platoon leaders indicated that their training guidance comes through the chain of command. Several (23.8%) of the respondents indicated that training guidance is provided by the Master Training Calendar. (I-86, Part 1).
2. More than half (57.9%) of the battalion commanders, company commanders, and platoon leaders indicated that their training guidance is specified as training goals. Several (26.3%) of the respondents said that much of their guidance consists of changes in the schedules or additional commitments which are attached as the training guidance comes down through the chain of command. The rest (21.1%) claimed that the training guidance which they receive consists of "non-substantive" requirements. (I-86, Part 2).
3. G3s reported that management of battalion external ARTEP is handled at brigade level with assistance from Division. (I-94).
4. With one exception the battalion S3s said that training objectives, scenarios, and support plans for FTXs and evaluations are retained as a matter of record. A battalion S3 at Division C, however, reported that he did not know whether such materials were retained since brigade handles battalion ARTEPs. (I-75).
5. The majority (81.8%) of the target respondents thought current Army publications serve company grade officers very well or superior as sources of doctrine and guidance. Respondents at Division D were slightly less enthusiastic than others: 60% of the respondents at Division D expressed the opinion that current publications are only adequate. Brigade commanders were most enthusiastic of the target respondents; 62.5% of them rated current Army publications as "superior" sources of doctrine and guidance for company grade officers. (I-96).

Table 1.3
Interview Comments Regarding Policies, Regulations
and Training Guidance

- . WHERE DOES YOUR TRAINING GUIDANCE COME FROM?
(I-86, Part 1).

Response Categories

Chain of
Command
a

Master Training
Calendar
b

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mode
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bn Comdr	n	a	a	n	a	a,b	a	b	a
Co Comdr	b	a	b	a,b	a	a	a	a	a
PLT Ldr	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	n	a
<u>Mode</u>	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	-	
<u>Mode</u>	a		a		a		a		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	a	a

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	n
f	18	5	3

- . WHAT DOES YOUR TRAINING GUIDANCE
USUALLY CONSIST OF? (I-86, Part 2).

Response Scale

Training Goals	Changes Or Added Committments	Non- Substantive Requirements
a	b	c

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mode
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bn Comdr	n	n	a	n	a	a	b	a	a
Co Comdr	b	a	c	n	a	a	c	a	a
PLT Ldr	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>a,c</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	a,b
Mode	-	-	a,c	-	a	a	b	a	
Mode	[]		[]		[]		[]		
	-		-		a		-		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
Mode	a	a

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	c	n
f	11	5	4	5

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bn Comdr

--

Co Comdr

Starts with the division master schedule telling us what cycle we will be in. To this is added the brigade, and battalion guidance. It looks good on paper but all the other requirements are killing us.

PLT Ldr

The company commander plus guidance from higher HQ. The company commander actually lets us prepare our own training schedule.

Infantry

Bn Comdr

It comes from brigade and the ADC (assistant division commander).

Co Comdr

We receive training goals from battalion commander. Generally it's fairly good.

PLT Ldr

From battalion through company. We plan resources and time required. I have about 40% confidence in an initial training schedule.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bn Comdr

FORSCOM division commander, brigade commander. We are not at all loss for guidance. The how to do it is left up to me. Works well.

Co Comdr

Current S3 annual calendar. Brigade training guidance letter. Battalion training guidance letter. I find these to be relatively useless. I get most of my information by word of mouth. Doesn't work very good.

PLT Ldr

Down from battalion through the company commander. Sometimes good, sometimes bad.

Infantry

Bn Comdr

--

Co Comdr

Usually comes from the chain of command with the master schedule.

PLT Ldr

From battalion on a weekly lead-time basis. It's very centralized. We do have some leeway. Works OK.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bn Comdr

We have guidance from FORSCOM, division and brigade. The guidance is rather broad and I have no trouble living with it.

Co Comdr

Battalion. The present commander leaves it up to you to plan training. He provides necessary guidance.

PLT Ldr

I get it from the company, who gets it down the chain of command from battalion.

Infantry

Bn Comdr

AR350-1 and division and brigade commander. I submit my training requirements to higher echelons and they tell me where I can operate.

Co Comdr

We get training goals from brigade/battalion. There are changes but you have to expect them. Good written training guidance.

PLT Ldr

From company down through the chain of command. The company commander decides what we are going to do.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bn Comdr

Most from corps, division and brigade. Their guidance usually only gives me total requirements to be done in a year. Generally pretty good, but sometimes I feel we have too many requirements.

Co Comdr Through the chain of command. They appear well planned but, they change the program frequently. We react too much--our planning is not substantive.

PLT Ldr From the company commander in the form of a weekly training schedule. Its not bad, but we can't depend on the schedule. We frequently get changes in the way of unprogrammed requirements.

Infantry

Bn Comdr Series of "brief-backs" by the battalion commanders to division commander in which our yearly training program and progress are reviewed. Very good because it forces us to do our long range planning.

Co Comdr The battalion S3, who receives it from brigade. Brigade receives it from division. However this does not substitute for long range planning.

PLT Ldr Really don't get any.

HOW IS THE BATTALION EXTERNAL ARTEP
MANAGED? (I-94).

<u>Response Scale</u>			
Brigade Manages	Brigade Evaluates	Division Evaluates	Division Assists
a	b	c	d

Individual Responses:

	Division A Armor Infantry	Division B Armor Infantry	Division C ⁺ Armor Infantry	Division D ⁺ Armor Infantry
G3	a,b,d	a,c	a,d	a,b,d

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 By Brigade. Evaluation is under control of brigade commander and monitored by assistant division commander.

DIVISION B

G3 One brigade plans the other brigade executes. The division level evaluation group evaluates.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 At the brigade level. Again we do very few external ARTEPs. Division would supplement the brigade with extra assets.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 By brigade plus reinforced by division staff. Brigade writes and evaluates and the division supplements for battalion ARTEPs. Battalion does company and company handles platoon.

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bn S3

Yes, we have a file on the only ARTEP I have participated in.

Infantry

Bn S3

--

DIVISION B

Armor

Bn S3

Don't know--brigade handles the battalions.

Infantry

Bn S3

Yes.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bn S3

Yes.

Infantry

Bn S3

Yes. They are a good source of background material and can be used to determine the progress of the unit.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bn S3

We do have some, but I have not seen them since I have been S3.

Infantry

Bn S3

Yes--we have our complete files for the platoon ARTEPs.

- . ARE TRAINING OBJECTIVES, SCENARIOS,
AND SUPPORT PLANS FOR FTX'S AND
EVALUATIONS RETAINED AS A MATTER
OF RECORD? (I-75).

Response Scale

Yes	Some	Don't Know
a	b	c

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺	
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry
Bn S3	a	n	c	a	a	a	b	a

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	c	n
f	5	1	1	1

- HOW WELL DO CURRENT ARMY PUBLICATIONS
(FMS, TCS, "HOW TO FIGHT" MANUALS).
SERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS AS SOURCES
OF DOCTRINE AND GUIDANCE? (I-96).

Response Scale

Poorly	Adequate	Very Well	Superior
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde Comdr	4	3	4	4	4	3	4	2	3.5
Bn Comdr	4	3	4	3	2	4	2	2	3.0
PLT Ldr	3	3	3	3	3	n	3	n	3.0
<u>Mean</u>	3.7	3.0	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.0	
<u>Mean</u>	3.3		3.5		3.2		2.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.0	3.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	0	4	10	8	2

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr We have come five thousand miles in the field of publications.

Bn Comdr This effort is the best I've seen in 19 years. They are well put together to include the FM on tank gunnery.

PLT Ldr Fine. You should go by the new publications with common sense added.

Infantry

Bde Comdr They do a good job, but carry the "comic-book" syndrome too far. The expansion of information comes at the expense of depth of information.

Bn Comdr I am a fine believer in the new publications. They are very clear, readable.

PLT Ldr Very good, all we need at my level. If we have a chance to use them.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr Extremely good. We use them daily. I have been able to throw away the old publications.

Bn Comdr The new manuals are much easier to read than the old. They are a significant improvement over the old. The quality of doctrine has improved but we have a shortage of manuals.

PLT Ldr I get a lot out of them.

Infantry

Bde Comdr They are meaningful and are a significant improvement. It will be a major challenge to middle management to assimilate all this information.

Bn Comdr Very good and getting better. We may be getting too much. Maybe we are getting to the point we can't separate the basic material there.

PLT Ldr I like the now "How to Fight" type manuals. I think we isolate "tasks" too much, they should be more in line with a tactical mission.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr I think they are super--the best we have had. Their standards are the same through out the Army so a man should be able to go from one unit to another with no problem.

Bn Comdr All do well except ARTEP 71-2 (Mech Infantry/Tank Task Force). I do not think the standards are detailed enough there.

PLT Ldr I think they are very good. But I consider them as guidance which we must supplement with experience.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Very good. Its all right there in the pubs. The problem is in getting people to use the books.

Bn Comdr Excellent. I find no "comic book" syndrome. We have all thrown away our old manuals.

PLT Ldr We have a shortage of the manuals or they are not available. I use field manuals to prepare for my instructions.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr They are a quantum jump. The current deficiency with the pubs is actually in the education and experience of the users.

Bn Comdr Fairly good, but there are so many things changing that are not in the publications. So the Army should figure a way to keep the publications up-to-date.

PLT Ldr The manuals are very good. They are written at a level that the individual soldier can read and understand.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Reasonably good. The fundamental problem is that people don't use them enough. The manuals are better than before. The old ones have more details.

Bn Comdr Adequate. There are some areas in which they could be improved but by and large they are adequate. I am actually a believer in the ARTEP system.

PLT Ldr I am so busy I don't have or haven't had time to read them.

Current State of Training

Table 2.1 shows responses to questions about the current state of training. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. More than half (64.5%) of the Q1 respondents reported that the current state of training in operational readiness is adequate. There was some variability among the divisions: all (100%) of the respondents at Division B reported that the state of operational readiness training was at least adequate, but at Division C a substantial number (37.5%) of the respondents thought that the state of training in this area is inadequate. (Q1-3a).
2. More than half (64.5%) of the Q1 respondents reported that the current state of unit training is adequate and several (25.8%) of the respondents reported that it is excellent. (Q1-3b).
3. More than half (61.3%) of the Q1 respondents reported that the current state of individual training is adequate and a few (16.1%) reported that it is excellent. (Q1-3c).
4. Approximately half (49.0%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that the current state of training in tactics is adequate and several (27.5%) reported that training is excellent in this subject area. Respondents at Divisions B and C more often reported excellence in this area than did respondents at Divisions A and D. At all divisions, however, the platoon leaders were critical of the current state of training in tactics; more than half (62.5%) of the platoon leaders thought that the current state of training in this subject area is inadequate. (Q1-4a; Q2-3a).

5. More than half (61.6%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that the current state of weapons training is adequate. Platoon leaders were less satisfied with the state of weapons training than were other respondents; half (50.5%) of the platoon leaders reported that the current state of training in this subject area is inadequate. (Q1-4b; Q2-3b).

6. Most (82.7%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that the current state of training in support is adequate. (Q1-4c; Q2-3c).

7. More than half (59.6%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that the current state of training in maintenance is adequate. Respondents at Division B, particularly those in armor units, reported excellence in this area more often than did other respondents. Company commanders were the most critical of training in this area; more than half (62.5%) of the company commanders thought that the current state of training in maintenance is inadequate. (Q1-4d; Q2-3d).

8. More than half (65.4%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that the current state of training in communication is adequate. (Q1-4e; Q2-3e).

9. Though a few (21.4%) of the Q1 respondents thought that as many as 5% or 10% of their maneuver and arms platoons could be rated as "very poor," the majority (78.6%) thought that none of their platoons would be placed in this category. (Q1-2a).

10. Most (89.3%) of the Q1 respondents thought that no more than 20% of their maneuver and arms platoons could be placed in the "poor" category. (Q1-2b).

11. Approximately half (64.4%) of the Q1 respondents thought that no more than 25% of their maneuver and arms platoons would be placed in the "fair" category. But a substantial number (35.7%) of the respondents thought that as many as 50% of the platoons would be placed in this category. (Q1-2c).

12. Approximately half (46.4%) of the Q1 respondents thought that 26-50% of their platoons could be rated as "good." But a substantial number (42.9%) of the respondents indicated that no more than 25% of the platoons should be placed in this category. (Q1-2d).

13. The majority (75.0%) of the Q1 respondents thought that no more than 25% of their platoons would be rated in the "very good" category. (Q1-2e).

14. More than half (60.7%) of the Q1 respondents indicated that at least two-thirds of their maneuver and arms platoons should be placed in the "fair" or "good" categories. Company commanders placed more platoons in the "very good" category than did respondents at other echelons. Respondents in infantry units, particularly those at Division B, thought that more of their platoons would be rated as "very good." (Q1-2a, b, c, d, e).

15. More than half (61.4%) of the Q3 respondents said that their squad or crew is well trained as a team. But a substantial number (32.2%) said that are poorly or very poorly trained as a team. (Q3-1).

16. More than half (69.9%) of the Q3 respondents said that they are well trained as individuals, and a few (14.4%) indicated that they are very well trained. (Q3-2).

Table 2.1

Responses to Questions About the Current State of Training

IN YOUR UNIT, WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF TRAINING IN THE FOLLOWING GENERAL AREAS? (Q1-3).

a. Operational Readiness

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1.9
Bn S3	3	1		2	1	1	1	2	1.6
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
Co Comdr	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	2.1
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	1.7	2.3	2.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	2.3	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.9		2.3		1.6		1.9		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
Mean	1.8	2.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	7	20	4	0

b. Unit Training

<u>Response Scale</u>		
Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2.3
Bn S3	3	2		3	2	2	2	2	2.3
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2.1
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	2.0
<u>Mean</u>	1.7	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.0	2.5	1.7	2.0	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.9		2.7		2.3		1.9		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	2.3

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	3	20	8	0

c. Individual Training

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	1.7
Bn S3	3	1		2	1	2	2	2	1.9
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	2.0
Co Comdr	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	1.9
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	1.5	2.3	1.7	1.7	2.7	1.7	1.7	
<u>Mean</u>	1.7		2.0		2.3		1.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.9	1.9

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	7	19	5	0

- . IN YOUR UNIT, WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF TRAINING IN THE FOLLOWING SUBJECT AREAS? (Q1-4; Q2-3).

a. Tactics

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	2	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	2.1
Bn S3	2	2		3	2	2	2	2	2.1
Bn Ops NCO	1	3	3	2	2	3	n	2	2.3
Co Comdr	1	2	3	3	3	3	1	2	2.2
Co Tng NCO ⁺⁺	2		2		1	3	2		2.0
PLT Ldr	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	1.5
PLT Sgt	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2.0
<u>Mean</u>	1.6	2.2	2.2	2.7	1.9	2.4	1.7	1.8	
<u>Mean</u>	1.8		2.4		2.1		1.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.8	2.2

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	12	25	14	1

b. Weapons

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2.0
Bn S3	3	2		2	2	2	2	3	2.3
Bn Ops NCO	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	2.4
Co Comdr	1	2	2	3	2	3	1	2	2.0
Co Tng NCO ⁺⁺	2		2		2	2	2		2.0
PLT Ldr	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1.5
PLT Sgt	1	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1.9
<u>Mean</u>	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.2	
<u>Mean</u>	1.8		2.1		2.0		2.1		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.9	2.1

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	10	32	10	0

c. Support

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
Bn S3	2	2		2	1	2	2	2	1.9
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
Co Comdr	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2.1
Co Tng NCO ⁺⁺	2		2		2	2	1		1.8
PLT Ldr	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1.9
PLT Sgt	2	2	1	3	1	2	2	2	1.9
<u>Mean</u>	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.3	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.0	
	1.8		2.2		1.9		1.9		
<u>Mean</u>	1.8		2.2		1.9		1.9		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.8	2.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	6	43	3	0

d. Maintenance

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1.8
Bn S3	2	1		2	2	2	2	2	1.9
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
Co Comdr	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	1	1.5
Co Tng NCO ⁺⁺	1		2		2	2	1		1.6
PLT Ldr	2	1	3	3	2	2	3	2	2.2
PLT Sgt	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	2	1.8
<u>Mean</u>	1.3	1.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.8	
<u>Mean</u>	1.4		2.2		1.9		1.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	1.7

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	15	31	6	0

e. Communication

Response Scale

Inadequate	Adequate	Excellent
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
Bn S3	2	2		3	2	2	2	1	2.0
Bn Ops NCO	1	2	3	2	3	2	2	1	2.0
Co Comdr	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1.5
Co Tng NCO ⁺⁺	1		2		2	2	2		1.8
PLT Ldr	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1.8
PLT Sgt	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1.4
<u>Mean</u>	1.6	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.3	
	1.6		1.8		2.0		1.6		
<u>Mean</u>	1.6		1.8		2.0		1.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.8	1.7

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	n
f	15	34	3	0

- WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE MANEUVER AND ARMS PLATOONS IN YOUR ORGANIZATION WOULD YOU PLACE IN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES? (Q1-2).

a. Very Poor

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	n	2.9
Bn S3	0	0		0	10	0	n	0	1.7
Bn Ops NCO	5	0	n	0	0	0	0	10	2.1
Co Comdr	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0.6
<u>Mean</u>	3.7	2.5	0	0	3.7	0	0	3.3	
<u>Mean</u>	3.2		0		1.9		1.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.2	0.8

Frequency Distribution:

	0-25	26-50	51-75	76-100	n
f	28	0	0	0	3

b. Poor

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	10	20	10	8	20	10	19	n	13.9
Bn S3	0	20		10	40	0	n	0	11.7
Bn Ops NCO	15	10	n	0	5	0	20	20	10.0
Co Comdr	0	33.3	0	0	10	0	100	0	17.9
<u>Mean</u>	6.2	20.8	5.0	4.5	18.7	2.5	46.3	6.7	
<u>Mean</u>	13.5		4.7		10.6		26.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	21.1	7.8

Frequency Distribution:

	0-25	26-50	51-75	76-100	n
f	25	2	1	0	3

c. Fair

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	30	25	80	16	50	20	60	n	40.1
Bn S3	25	80		30	50	20	n	50	42.5
Bn Ops NCO	30	60	n	0	50	20	30	20	30.0
Co Comdr	100	33.3	0	0	35	25	0	25	16.0
<u>Mean</u>	46.2	49.6	40.0	11.5	46.3	21.2	30.0	31.7	
<u>Mean</u>	47.9		21.0		33.7		30.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	35.6	30.3

Frequency Distribution:

	0-25	26-50	51-75	76-100	n
f	13	10	2	3	3

d. Good

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	50	25	10	16	25	40	21	n	26.7
Bn S3	75	0		20	0	60		50	34.2
Bn Ops NCO	50	30	n	75	45	30	40	20	41.4
Co Comdr	0	33.3	33.3	25	40	50	0	50	29.0
<u>Mean</u>	43.7	22.1	21.7	34.0	27.5	45.0	20.3	40.0	
<u>Mean</u>	33.0		29.9		36.3		30.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	31.5	36.9

Frequency Distribution:

	0-25	26-50	51-75	76-100	n
f	12	13	3	0	3

e. Very Good

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	20	0	60	5	30	0	n	16.4
Bn S3	0	0		40	0	20	n	0	10.0
Bn Ops NCO	0	0	n	25	0	50	10	30	16.4
Co Comdr	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>66.7</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>25</u>	25.2
<u>Mean</u>	0	5.0	33.3	50.0	3.7	31.3	3.3	18.3	
<u>Mean</u>	2.5		44.4		17.5		10.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	9.6	24.2

Frequency Distribution:

	0-25	26-50	51-75	76-100	n
f	21	4	3	0	3

HOW WELL TRAINED IS YOUR SQUAD OR CREW AS A TEAM? (Q3-1).

Response Scale

Very Poorly Trained	Poorly Trained	Well Trained	Very Well Trained
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

Squad/Crew Members	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Total
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
1	2	2	2	3	4	3	3	3	3
2	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
3	2	3	3	3	3	2	1	3	3
4	3	2	n	3	2	3	2	2	2
5	3	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	3
6	3	4	2	3	2	3	2	3	3
7	n	3	3	3	3	2	n	n	n
8	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3
9	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
10	4	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	3
11	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	3
12	3	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	3
13	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3	3
14	3	2	3	2		2	3	3	3
15	3	3		3		3		3	3
16		2		3		2		2	2
17		1		4		2		2	3
18		3		3		2		2	3
19		2		3		3		3	4
20		3		3		2		2	3
21		2		3		2		2	3
22		2		3		4		4	3
<u>Mean</u>	2.7	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.9	
<u>Mean</u>	2.5		2.8		2.8		2.8		
			<u>Armor</u>		<u>Infantry</u>				
			<u>Mean</u>		2.7		2.7		

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	3	42	86	9	4

HOW WELL TRAINED ARE YOU AS AN INDIVIDUAL? (Q3-2).

Response Scale

Very Poorly Trained	Poorly Trained	Well Trained	Very Well Trained
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

Squad/Crew Members	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺	
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry
1	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	4
2	3	2	3	2	4	3	3	3
3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	1	2	3	3	3	4	2	3
5	3	2	3	3	4	4	3	3
6	3	3	3	3	3	4	1	3
7	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3
8	2	4	3	4	3	4	2	3
9	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	4
10	4	3	3	3	4	3	4	3
11	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3
12	3	3	3	2	4	4	3	3
13	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3
14	3	3	3	3		3	3	3
15	3	3	4	3		3		3
16		3		3		2		3
17		3		3		2		3
18		3		3		3		3
19		3		3		3		2
20		3		3		1		3
21		3		2		2		3
22		2				3		n
<u>Mean</u>	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.5	3.0	2.7	3.1
<u>Mean</u>	2.8		2.9		3.2		2.9	
			<u>Mean</u>					
					<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>		
					3.0	3.0		

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	3	20	100	20	1

Table 2.2 shows interview comments regarding the current state of training in several general areas. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. The majority (77.8%) of the G3s, brigade S3s, and battalion S3s who responded thought that the current state of operational readiness training is "good" or "excellent". (I-44a).

2. Though a few (16.7%) of them indicated that the current state of unit training is "very poor", the majority (77.7%) of the G3s, brigade S3s, and battalion S3s who responded thought that the current state of unit training is "fair" or "good". (I-44b).

3. Though a few (12.5%) of them thought that the current state of individual training is "very poor", the majority (82.8%) of the G3s, brigade S3s, and battalion S3s who responded thought that the current state of individual training is "fair" or "good". (I-44c).

Table 2.2

Interview Comments Regarding the Current State of Training

- . IN YOUR UNIT WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS TRAINING? (I-44a).

Response Scale

Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
G3	3		n		3		5		3.7
Bde S3	4	5	4	n	4	5	4	4	4.3
Bn S3	4	1	4	4	2	4	4	4	3.4
<u>Mean</u>	4.0	3.0	4.0	-	3.0	4.5	4.0	4.0	
<u>Mean</u>	3.4		4.0		3.6		4.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.5	3.3

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	1	2	11	3	2

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Fair, under present circumstances.

Armor

Bde Comdr Can and will fight. One battalion just back from Korea and short personnel, so they are not combat ready. Post is not only technically fit but willing to fight.

BN Comdr Good.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Highest state I've seen, mainly because we have just returned from REFORGER.

Bn Comdr In February we were ready--now due to personnel losses, I have to start over at individual training level.

DIVISION B

G3 --

Armor

Bde Comdr Good .

Bn Comdr Good .

Infantry

Bde Comdr --

Bn Comdr Good .

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Fair under circumstances. Short one Brigade .

Armor

Bde Comdr Good .

Bn Comdr Poor--equipment not all here .

Infantry

Bde Comdr Fair .

Bn Comdr Good .

DIVISION D⁺

G3 C2 level according to AR 220-1.

Armor

Bde Comdr They can do what is required when required.

Bn Comdr Good.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Good.

Bn Comdr Basically well trained.

IN YOUR UNIT, WHAT IS THE CURRENT
STATE OF UNIT TRAINING? (I-44b).

Response Scale

Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3	3		n		3		3		3.0
Bde S3	4	1	4	1	1	3	3	3	2.5
Bn S3	4	n	3	4	3	3	3	2	3.1
Mean	4.0	-	3.5	2.5	2.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	
Mean	3.0		3.0		2.6		2.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
Mean	3.3	3.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	3	1	10	4	0	2

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Fair, under present circumstances.

Armor

Bde Comdr Can and will fight.

Bn Comdr Some shortfall.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Turbulence has affected the squad level training status (just returned from REFORGER).

Bn Comdr --

DIVISION B

G3 --

Armor

Bde Comdr Good.

Bn Comdr Good with refresher and people.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Back to square one.

Bn Comdr Good.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Fair, under circumstances.

Armor

Bde Comdr Just getting off the ground.

Bn Comdr Fair at platoon level.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Fair.

Bn Comdr Pretty good at squad--at higher levels, I don't know.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Fair

Armor

Bde Comdr Better than individual training.

Bn Comdr Good at platoon. At company, unknown.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Fair to good.

Bn Comdr Not very good on day to day events. We have a tendency to do an unprofessional job on routine training that is not specifically designated as "important".

. IN YOUR UNIT, WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE
OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING? (I-44c).

Response Scale

Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3	3		3		3		3		3.0
Bde S3	3	1	5	n	4	4	n	n	3.4
Bn S3	4	n	3	4	3	4	4	1	3.3
<u>Mean</u>	3.5	-	4.0	-	3.5	4.0	-	-	
<u>Mean</u>	2.7		3.7		3.6		2.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.5	3.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	2	0	7	6	1	4

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Fair, under present circumstances.

Armor

Bde Comdr Fair. Getting better as manuals and SQTs come out and we hold their feet to the fire. NCOs are getting deeper into the training program.

Bn Comdr Good.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Weakest of all because it is the most perishable because of the low knowledge retention rate.

Bn Comdr --

DIVISION B

G3 --

Armor

Bde Comdr Very good.

Bn Comdr Fine, but due to our low strength, we are actually combat ineffective

Infantry

Bde Comdr Acceptable, but does not meet my standards. The reason lies in the personnel turnover.

Bn Comdr Good.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Fair under circumstances

Armor

Bde Comdr Good.

Bn Comdr Fair.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Good.

Bn Comdr Good--we just came off the SQT.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Overall fair. We have shortages in NCOs. We have had considerable turnover in personnel.

Armor

Bde Comdr Not good enough.

Bn Comdr Good.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Fair.

Bn Comdr Problem of the number of discrete skills the soldier needs to know and his propensity for forgetting so soon the knowledge he has acquired.

Command Emphasis

Table 3 shows responses to questions regarding command emphasis for certain missions and problem areas relevant to the training environment. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. More than half (60.8%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that their superiors attach more than average importance to the problem of drug abuse control. Approximately half (54.9%) of the respondents indicated that they themselves attach more than average importance to this problem. Respondents at company and platoon levels attached more importance to the problem of drug abuse control than did respondents at brigade and battalion levels. (Q1-5a).

2. Only 20% of the respondents perceived that there was more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to the problem of drug abuse control. Of this group, approximately half thought that superiors attach more importance to the problem and the other half thought that their superiors attach less importance than should be attached to the problem of drug abuse control (Q1-6a; Q2-5a).

3. A substantial number (43.1%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents indicated that their superiors attach average importance to the problem of community relations. Several (21.6%), however, believed that superiors attach very high importance to this problem. With reference to themselves, approximately half (45.0%) of the respondents agreed that average importance should be attached to this problem. Only a few of them (11.8%) thought that it merited very high importance. (Q1-6b; Q2-5b).

4. Only 22.4% of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to the problem of community relations. The majority of these (72.7%) thought that their superiors attach more importance than should be attached to this problem. (Q1-6b; Q2-5b).

5. More than half (60.8%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that their superiors attach more than average importance to the problem of race relations. In fact, a substantial number (33.3%) of the respondents indicated that their superiors attach very high importance to this problem. Their own opinion was that it should be of slightly less importance: a substantial number (42.0%) of the respondents thought that the problem of race relations should be of only average importance and a few (11.7%) thought it should obtain less than average importance. (Q1-6c; Q2-5c).

6. Only 20.0% of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to the problem of race relations. The majority (70.0%) of these thought that their superiors attach more importance than should be attached to this problem. (Q1-6c; Q2-5c).

7. Though most (92.2%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents indicated that small unit training should be of above average importance, nearly half (45.1%) of them perceived that their superiors attach only average or below average importance to this mission. Brigade S3s, company commanders, and platoon leaders attached more importance to small unit training than did other respondents; 91.3% of this group felt that small unit training should obtain very high importance. (Q1-6d; Q2-5d).

8. Several (28.0%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to the mission of small unit training. Nearly all (92.9%) of these reported that their superiors attach less importance than should be attached to this mission. (Q1-6d; Q2-5d).

9. More than half (58.8%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that average or less than average importance should be attached to command inspection. They perceived that their superiors concur on this issue, as is evidenced in the fact that 62.0% of the respondents reported that their superiors attach average or less than average importance to command inspection. (Q1-6e; Q2-5e).

10. Though several (28.0%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to the issue of command inspection, these respondents were divided in their opinion about whether more or less importance should be accorded; 57.1% of them thought that their superiors attach more importance and 42.9% thought that superiors attach less importance than should be attached to the issue of command inspection. (Q1-6e; Q2-5e).

11. Most (90.2%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents indicated that operational missions should be accorded more than average importance, and the majority (80.6%) of the respondents believed that their superiors do attach more than average importance to operational missions. (Q1-6f; Q2-5f).

12. Only a few (14.0%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to operational missions. Most (85.7%) of these felt that their superiors attach less importance to operational missions than should be accorded. (Q1-6f; Q2-5f).

13. More than half (58.0%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents indicated that vehicular maintenance should be accorded very high importance, and approximately half (46.0%) of the respondents believed that their superiors do attach very high importance to this mission. As might be expected, company and platoon personnel attached more importance to vehicular maintenance than did respondents at other levels: 78.6% of the company and platoon level respondents indicated that very high importance should be attached in this area while only 31.8% of the other respondents thought that vehicular maintenance deserves very high importance. (Q1-6g; Q2-5g).

14. Only a few (10.4%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to vehicle maintenance. Of these, half thought that seniors attach more and half thought that superiors attach less importance than should obtain for operational missions. (Q1-6g; Q2-5g).

15. Although more than half (58.0%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that administration should obtain only average or less than average importance, they perceived that their superiors attach more importance in this area. More than half (56.0%) of the respondents believe that their superiors attach more than average importance to administration. NCOs seemed to think that administration requires more importance than did other respondents: 66.7% of the NCOs thought that administration should be accorded more than average importance while only 24.1% of the other respondents indicated that this should be the case. (Q1-6h; Q2-5h).

16. Several (29.2%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to administration. The majority (71.4%) of these believed that seniors attach more importance to administration than should be attached. (Q1-6h; Q2-5h).

17. More than half (62.8%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents thought that SQT training should be accorded very high importance but they did not believe that their superiors attach such importance to this mission. Only 35.3% of the respondents thought that their superiors attach very high importance to SQT training. It is perhaps worthy of note that a few (18.8%) of the platoon level respondents indicated that SQT training should be accorded very low importance. (Q1-6i; Q2-5i).

18. Only a few (16.3%) of the respondents perceived that there is more than one scale unit of difference in the importance which they and their superiors attach to SQT training. All of these respondents were situated in Divisions A and B. Most (87.5%) of them thought that their superiors attach less importance to SQT training than should be accorded. (Q1-6i; Q2-5i).

Table 3

Responses to Questions Concerning Command Emphasis

LISTED BELOW ARE A NUMBER OF MISSIONS OR PROBLEM AREAS A TYPICAL UNIT MIGHT HAVE TO DEAL WITH IN A THREE-MONTH PERIOD. FIRST, INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE THAT YOU BELIEVE YOUR SUPERIORS ATTACH TO THESE MISSIONS/PROBLEMS. SECOND, INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THESE MISSIONS/PROBLEMS. (Q1-6, Q2-5).

a. Drug abuse control

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	5	3	2	4	3	4	4	3.5
Bn S3	3	3		5	4	5	4	3	3.9
Bn Ops NCO	2	3	4	5	3	4	4	4	3.6
Co Comdr	5	5	1	3	n	3	5	3	3.6
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	2		5		4	3	1		3.0
PLT Ldr	4	4	3	5	3	4	5	5	4.1
PLT Sgt	3	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	4.5
<u>Mean</u>	3.1	4.2	3.5	4.0	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	3.6		3.8		3.8		4.0		

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	2.8
Bn S3	3	3		2	3	5	3	3	3.1
Bn Ops NCO	4	3	5	3	3	3	5	5	3.9
Co Comdr	2	5	5	n	3	4	5	3	3.9
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		5		4	4	5		4.6
PLT Ldr	4	4	3	5	4	4	5	5	4.2
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	4	5	5	4	1	4.1
<u>Mean</u>	3.6	3.8	4.3	3.4	3.6	4.0	4.3	3.0	
<u>Mean</u>	3.7		3.9		3.8		3.7		
			<u>Mean</u>		<u>Armor</u>		<u>Infantry</u>		
					4.1		3.8		

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	2	2	19	11	17	1

b. Community Relations

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	5	4	2	5	4	3	4	3.8
Bn S3	1	2		5	5	5	3	3	3.4
Bn Ops NCO	1	3	2	5	3	5	3	4	3.2
Co Comdr	3	4	3	4	n	3	3	3	3.3
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	2		3		3	3	1		2.4
PLT Ldr	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	4	3.4
PLT Sgt	3	5	5	5	4	5	3	2	4.0
<u>Mean</u>	2.3	3.8	3.3	4.2	3.8	4.0	2.7	3.3	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	3.0		3.8		3.9		3.0		

2. Importance Attached by Self

<u>Response Scale</u>				
Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	3	4	2	1	5	2	3	1	2.6
Bn S3	1	2		1	3	3	3	3	2.3
Bn Ops NCO	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	3.1
Co Comdr	1	1	3	n	2	3	3	3	2.3
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	4		4		3	4	3		3.6
PLT Ldr	3	5	3	3	4	3	2	5	3.5
PLT Sgt	3	5	5	1	4	5	1	3	3.5
<u>Mean</u>	2.4	3.3	3.5	1.8	3.4	3.3	2.6	3.2	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	2.8		2.7		3.4		2.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.9	3.2

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	8	6	23	8	6	1

c. Race Relations

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	5	3	4	5	5	4	4	4.1
Bn S3	3	3		3	5	5	4	3	3.7
Bn Ops NCO	3	4	3	5	3	5	3	5	3.9
Co Comdr	1	5	3	4	n	3	5	4	3.6
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	2		3		3	4	4		3.2
PLT Ldr	4	5	3	5	3	4	2	5	3.9
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	4	4	5	3	5	4.4
<u>Mean</u>	2.9	4.5	3.3	4.2	3.8	4.4	3.6	4.3	
	3.6		3.8		4.2		3.9		
<u>Mean</u>	3.6		3.8		4.2		3.9		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.3	4.3

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	2	17	14	17	1

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	5	3	4	4	2	3	1	3.1
Bn S3	3	3		3	3	5	3	3	3.3
Bn Ops NCO	3	3	5	3	3	4	5	5	3.9
Co Comdr	1	1	3	n	3	3	5	4	2.9
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		4		3	4	4		4.0
PLT Ldr	3	5	1	4	4	4	2	5	3.5
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	3	4	5	3	3	4.0
<u>Mean</u>	3.1	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.9	3.6	3.5	
	3.4		3.5		3.6		3.5		
<u>Mean</u>	3.4		3.5		3.6		3.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.4	3.8

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	4	2	21	12	12	1

d. Small Unit Training

1. Importance Attached by Superior

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	3	4	4	5	4	3	3	3.8
Bn S3	3	4		3	3	4	3	3	3.3
Bn Ops NCO	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	3.8
Co Comdr	3	3	3	2	n	4	5	4	3.4
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	3		4		5	5	3		4.0
PLT Ldr	5	2	2	2	4	4	5	3	3.4
PLT Sgt	2	5	5	2	5	5	5	3	4.0
<u>Mean</u>	3.4	3.5	3.7	2.7	4.2	4.3	4.0	3.3	
	3.5		3.2		4.2		3.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.8	3.5

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	6	17	17	11	1

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.9
Bn S3	4	4		4	3	5	4	4	4.0
Bn Ops NCO	4	5	5	4	5	4	3	5	4.4
Co Comdr	5	5	5	n	5	5	5	5	5.0
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	4		3		5	5	3		4.0
PLT Ldr	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	4.9
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	4	4.6
<u>Mean</u>	4.3	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.6	4.9	4.3	4.7	
<u>Mean</u>	4.5		4.5		4.7		4.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	4.4	4.6

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	0	4	14	33	1

e. Command Inspection

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	3	3.4
Bn S3	2	3		2	5	3	5	4	3.4
Bn Ops NCO	3	3	2	3	3	4	3	5	3.2
Co Comdr	2	2	3	2	n	n	5	4	3.0
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	4		5		3	2	5		3.8
PLT Ldr	4	3	3	5	3	3	3	3	3.4
PLT Sgt	3	3	1	5	2	5	4	5	3.5
<u>Mean</u>	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.5	4.0	4.0	
<u>Mean</u>	3.0		3.2		3.3		4.0		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.3	3.4

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	8	22	9	10	2

2. Importance by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	3	4	2	2	4	3	5	3	3.2
Bn S3	3	4		3	3	2	4	3	3.1
Bn Ops NCO	3	3	4	4	2	3	4	3	3.2
Co Comdr	3	4	3	n	3	3	3	3	3.1
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	3		5		3	5	5		4.2
PLT Ldr	4	4	1	3	3	4	3	4	3.2
PLT Sgt	3	4	5	1	5	5	5	1	3.6
<u>Mean</u>	3.1	3.8	3.3	2.6	3.3	3.6	4.1	2.8	
<u>Mean</u>	3.5		3.0		3.4		3.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.5	3.3

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	3	4	23	13	8	1

f. Operational Missions

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	4	5	3	3	4	3	4	3.8
Bn S3	4	3		4	5	3	3	4	3.7
Bn Ops NCO	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	5	3.9
Co Comdr	3	4	4	5	n	3	5	5	4.1
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	4		5		3	4	4		4.0
PLT Ldr	4	2	3	4	4	4	4	5	3.8
PLT Sgt	2	5	5	5	3	5	5	4	4.2
<u>Mean</u>	3.4	3.7	4.2	4.2	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.5	
<u>Mean</u>	3.5		4.2		3.8		4.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.8	4.1

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	2	13	23	13	1

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	5	3	5	4	5	4	5	4.4
Bn S3	4	3		5	3	4	5	4	4.0
Bn Ops NCO	3	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	4.4
Co Comdr	4	5	5	n	5	4	5	5	4.7
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		5		3	5	4		4.4
PLT Ldr	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4.2
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	4	4.6
<u>Mean</u>	4.0	4.2	4.5	4.8	4.0	4.6	4.6	4.5	
<u>Mean</u>	4.2		4.7		4.3		4.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	4.3	4.4

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	0	5	21	25	1

g. Vehicular Maintenance

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	n	4	5	4	4	5	4	4.1
Bn S3	4	4		4	4	5	5	4	4.3
Bn Ops NCO	4	3	4	4	4	5	3	5	4.0
Co Comdr	4	5	4	5	n	3	5	5	4.4
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		4		5	5	5		4.8
PLT Ldr	3	5	4	5	4	5	5	4	4.4
PLT Sgt	2	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	4.4
<u>Mean</u>	3.6	4.4	4.2	4.5	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.5	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	3.9		4.3		4.4		4.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	4.2	4.5

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	1	5	21	23	2

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde S3	3	n	4	4	4	3	5	5	4.0
Bn S3	4	4		4	4	3	4	4	3.9
Bn Ops NCO	4	4	5	5	5	3	5	5	4.5
Co Comdr	5	5	5	n	5	3	5	5	4.7
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		5		5	5	4		4.8
PLT Ldr	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	5	4.5
PLT Sgt	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.0
<u>Mean</u>	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.6	3.9	4.6	4.8	
<u>Mean</u>	4.5		4.5		4.2		4.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	4.7	4.4

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	0	0	5	16	29	2

h. Administration

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	n	3	3	3	4	5	3	3.4
Bn S3	5	3		5	3	3	5	4	4.0
Bn Ops NCO	2	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	3.4
Co Comdr	5	5	3	4	n	3	5	4	4.1
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	4		4		5	4	5		4.4
PLT Ldr	5	5	3	5	3	5	3	3	4.0
PLT Sgt	5	5	1	5	2	5	3	2	3.5
<u>Mean</u>	4.1	4.4	2.8	4.2	3.2	4.0	4.3	3.3	
<u>Mean</u>	4.2		3.5		3.6		3.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.7	4.0

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	3	18	11	17	2

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	3	n	2	3	4	3	3	3	3.0
Bn S3	3	3		3	4	3	3	4	3.3
Bn Ops NCO	4	3	4	4	4	3	3	4	3.6
Co Comdr	2	3	5	n	3	3	5	3	3.4
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	3		4		5	5	5		4.4
PLT Ldr	4	3	3	3	3	5	3	3	3.4
PLT Sgt	3	5	5	1	3	5	4	4	3.8
<u>Mean</u>	3.1	3.4	3.8	2.8	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.5	
<u>Mean</u>	3.2		3.4		3.8		3.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.7	3.2

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	2	26	12	9	2

i. SQT Training

1. Importance Attached by Superiors

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	3	3	5	5	4	4	4	4.0
Bn S3	3	4		3	4	3	5	4	3.7
Bn Ops NCO	3	4	2	4	4	3	5	5	3.8
Co Comdr	4	5	2	1	n	4	5	5	3.7
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	2		4		5	5	5		4.2
PLT Ldr	4	3	2	3	4	5	5	4	3.8
PLT Sgt	4	5	5	3	3	5	5	5	4.4
<u>Mean</u>	3.4	4.0	3.0	3.2	4.2	4.1	4.9	4.5	
<u>Mean</u>	3.7		3.1		4.2		4.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	3.9	4.2

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	1	4	11	17	18	1

2. Importance Attached by Self

Response Scale

Very Low Importance	Below Average Importance	Average Importance	Above Average Importance	Very High Importance
1	2	3	4	5

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	4	5	4	5	4	5	5	4	4.5
Bn S3	4	4		4	3	5	5	5	4.3
Bn Ops NCO	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4.6
Co Comdr	4	4	5	n	5	5	5	5	4.7
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	5		3		5	5	5		4.6
PLT Ldr	4	5	1	5	4	5	5	5	4.2
PLT Sgt	5	5	1	5	3	5	5	1	3.8
<u>Mean</u>	4.1	4.5	3.2	4.8	4.1	5.0	5.0	4.2	
<u>Mean</u>	4.3		3.9		4.6		4.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	4.1	4.6

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	5	n
f	3	0	4	12	32	1

Resource Availability and Constraints

Table 4 shows interview comments regarding resource availability and constraints. These comments can be summarized as follows:

1. Although only one of the eight (87.5%) brigade S3s who were interviewed thought that there is a conflict between training budget and training requirements, all four (100%) of the G3s reported that such conflicts do exist. At Divisions B and D there is a reported conflict of time and training requirements. At Division A the conflict involves available ammunition. And at Division C the conflict involves available fuel. Respondents indicated that such conflicts are usually resolved by eliminating the lowest priority training activities. (I-91).

2. The G3s who were interviewed were unable to estimate the average cost of a training day, though they indicated that they were trying to collect requisite information for computing such costs. (I-72).

3. The cost of a battalion external ARTEP was estimated in several ways by the G3s who were interviewed. One of them reported that the ARTEP costs 5 days, another estimated that it cost one battalion or 40 extra people, and a third said the cost was \$600,000. (I-73).

4. Most (85.7%) of the battalion commanders who were interviewed reported that their overall strength agreed very closely with their TO&E. A substantial number (42.9%) of the company commanders reported that, to the contrary, their manning levels did not agree very closely with their TO&E. (I-83).

5. More than half (62.5%) of the target respondents specified that their manning levels for key NCO grades did not agree very closely with their TOE. (I-83).

Table 4
Interview Comments Concerning Resource Availability and Constraints

. IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN TRAINING
BUDGET AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS?
IF SO, HOW IS IT RESOLVED? (I-91).

Response Categories

Yes	No
a	b

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
G3		b		b		b		b	b
Bde S3	a	a	a	a	a	a	b	a	a

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	n
f	7	5	0

Comments:

DIVISION A

- G3 Not so much at present, but we feel the crunch coming. We just decrement it out--drop some stuff out the bottom and we go from the Master Training Plan.
- Bde S3 Ammunition is a problem, so training is restricted. Division is operating on 48% of allocation according to CTA. What we have to do is reduced training.
- Bde S3 Perceive no problem.

DIVISION B

- G3 We are in good shape for mission money this year. We have also sent one brigade to Fort Irwin, which was unprogrammed.
- Bde S3 No trouble with money but there is trouble with time. We don't have enough time.
- Bde S3 They are adequate.

DIVISION C⁺

- G3 Sufficient funds are normally made available. We have been delayed in converting to full mechanized, but that is not training funds.
- Bde S3 We will have restrictions on fuel, but not now,
- Bde S3 No conflict because of lack of funding.

DIVISION D⁺

- G3 Time is the biggest constraint. But we do have sufficient money and resources to do the job.
- Bde S3 We have the dollars to do what we want to do. Our big problem is time to train.
- Bde S3 We seem to have sufficient money so far. Maybe in the future.

- . WHAT DOES A TRAINING DAY COST
ON THE AVERAGE? (I-72).

Response Categories

Don't know

a

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺	
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry
G3	a		a		a		a	

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Don't have the data to compute the cost although we are trying to capture the data.

DIVISION B

G3 We don't know. We are trying to accumulate such information now.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 We don't have the information to compute these costs here in the division.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Don't have numbers on this. We are working on it.

. WHAT DOES A BATTALION EXTERNAL
ARTEP COST? (I-73)

Response Categories

Time	People	Money	No external ARTEPs
a	b	c	d

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺	
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry
G3	a		b		d		c	

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 About five days time to field resources of Brigade.

DIVISION B

G3 Takes one battalion to support another. We feel it takes about 40 extra people as evaluators.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 External ARTEPs are discouraged by Division policy. We would supplement the Brigade with Division personnel if an External ARTEP were conducted. I think it would take a brigade plus. ARTEP is a very high resource-cost method of training.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Around 600K but the problem is that we don't know the costs.

HOW CLOSELY DOES YOUR ORGANIZATION'S
MANNING AGREE WITH YOUR TO&E STRENGTH
AND GRADE? (I-83).

a. Regarding Overall Strength

Response Categories

Not Very Close

Very Close

a

b

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mode
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bn Comdr	b	b	a	b	b	b	b	n	b
Co Comdr	b	b	n	a	a	a	a	b	a
	[]		[]		[]		[]		
<u>Mode</u>	b		--		--		--		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	b	b

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	n
f	5	9	2

b. Regarding key NCO grades

Response Categories

Not Very Close

a

Very Close

b

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mode
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bn Comdr	a	b	n	n	a	a	a	n	a
Co Comdr	b	a	a	a	n	a	a	a	a
	[]		[]		[]		[]		
<u>Mode</u>	--		a		a		a		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	a	a

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	n
f	10	2	4

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bn Comdr Over 90%--Officers at 77%, WO at 100%, E5-E9 at 80% and E1-E4 at 121%.

Co Comdr Officers at 100% (5/5) and EM at 95% (79/83)

Infantry

Bn Comdr I am two officers short--that's the best I've ever been. The real problem is in the NCO structure--it's the E7 and E6 that gives me trouble.

Co Comdr We're short a few people. Most of the platoon sergeant are E6 rather than E7. Most of the squad leaders are E5 or acting E5 rather than E6. I have noticed that most battalions and higher staffs do not go short of their authorized strength.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bn Comdr We were as low as 355 out of 495 (71.7%). When I went on REFORGER I said I needed 30 people in order to have 4-man tank crews on all my tanks. I received 30 infantrymen to be used as ammo loaders.

Co Comdr Terribly understrength in key NCOs and I have had to modify my manning to accommodate the realities of garrison requirements. Currently I have only one E7 platoon sergeant and only four E6 out of 17 (23.5%).

Infantry

Bn Comdr About 80-85%. Plus I have projected losses in two companies in the next 60 days of over 30 men per company. I do not have a large number of SD personnel.

Co Comdr Not close at all. I am authorized 160 and have 111 (69.4%). Of the 111 there are 19 on special duty. Most of the SD are E6s. I have two E7, one is the 1st Sergeant. I am short only one officer.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bn Comdr We are short 60 men. The shortages are mainly 19E--the very guts of the battalion. The rank is mainly E5 and E6. The very heart of the matter is where we are weakest.

Co Comdr I'm at 60% strength now. I can move 16 out 17 tanks, but I can't crew them.

Infantry

Bn Comdr We are about 88% strength. We're hurting on senior grade--E5 through E9 at 65%.

Co Comdr We are short. I need E6s. I am short EM.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bn Comdr 94% of authorized strength. Shortages are concentrated in 19E E6. Right now the Battalion is at 39% of authorized 19E E6 and will be at 21% next month. Terrible shortage of scout privates not NCO, mortar privates, redeye privates. Commo sergeants now at 70% moving to 20%. I have no motor sergeant. I have no recovery personnel to speak of (3/15). I am told that even Europe is short these people. I this is true, something is really wrong with the reenlistment and promotion programs.

Co Comdr I am short. I am severely short in supply and maintenance areas. My 1st Sergeant is leaving and my only platoon sergeant will move up to take his place.

Infantry

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr I have 137 of a needed 166 but the people I do have are not key people. I don't have a qualified maintenance, NCO, supply NCO, commo NCO. I have only one E6 squad leader and all my acting squad leaders are only acting E5. My rifle squads are at one-half strength because after I provide my special duty people and try to maintain my equipment, I only have 50% strength squads. The special duty assignments (post DS-7 and BN SD-5) are 30 days with a requirement that I replace "in kind." I have only 42 people out of 137 present for training today--86SD, appointments, and "on leave." This is amber cycle, but it's the same for green.

Population

Table 5.1 shows responses to questions about the population of trainers and trainees. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. More than half (59%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that today's young soldier learns and remembers individual skills moderately well. (Q1-9a, Q2-9a).

2. Approximately half (53%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that today's young soldier learns and remembers collective skills moderately well. Very few respondents (4%) felt that the young soldier learns and remembers collective skills very well. (Q1-9b, Q2-9b).

3. Approximately half (54%) of the Q1 and Q2 respondents reported that today's crew commanders and squad leaders conduct squad and crew training moderately well. (Q1-8, Q2-8).

4. More than half (63%) of the Q1 respondents believed that today's NCOs E4-E6 display less initiative than did those of seven or eight years ago. (Q1-7, Part Ia).

5. More than half (57%) of the Q1 respondents reported that the professional knowledge of today's NCOs E4-E6 is not as good as that of the comparable group of seven or eight years ago. This opinion was expressed more often at Division D than at other divisions. (75% compared with 50%). (Q1-7, Part Ib).

6. More than half (63%) of the Q1 respondents stated that today's NCOs E4-E6 are not as good as those of seven or eight years ago in terms of leadership. Respondents at Division D reported this opinion more often than did respondents at other divisions (75% compared with 59%). Respondents in infantry units made this report more often than did respondents in armor units (91% compared with 60%). (Q1-7, Part Ic).

7. Half (50%) of the Q1 respondents stated that today's NCOs E4-E6 are less dependable than were those of seven or eight years ago. More than one third of the respondents (40%), however, reported that they were the same as the comparison group. Respondents in infantry units were more often pessimistic about the dependability of NCOs E4-E6 than were respondents in armor units (82% compared with 40%). (Q1-7, Part Id).

8. More than half (63%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's NCO E7-E9 exhibit the same or better initiative than did those of seven or eight years ago, although a substantial number (39%) felt that today's NCOs E7-E9 are not as good on this dimension. (Q1-7, Part IIa).

9. Nearly half (47%) of the Q1 respondents indicated that the professional knowledge of today's NCOs E7-E9 is not as good as that of a comparison group of seven or eight years ago. The majority (63%) of the company commanders responding to this question, however, felt that today's NCOs E7-E9 are better in terms of professional knowledge than those of seven or eight years ago. (Q1-7, Part IIb).

10. Nearly half (47%) of the Q1 respondents stated that the leadership of today's NCOs E7-E9 is not as good as that of a comparison group of seven or eight years ago. Respondents at battalion level (Bn S3 and Bn Ops NCOs) were more often critical of the NCOs leadership skills than were respondents at other echelons; 63% of the battalion-level respondents and only 29% of respondents at other levels reported that the leadership of today's NCOs E7-E9 is not as good. (Q1-7, Part IIc).

11. Half (50%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's NCOs E7-E9 are the same as those of seven or eight years ago in terms of dependability. (Q1-7, Part IId).

12. The majority (73%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's company grade officers exhibit the same or better initiative than did those of seven or eight years ago. Respondents in infantry units used the higher ratings more often than did respondents in armor units (83% compared with 55%). Respondents at Division A were more critical of this dimension than were respondents at other divisions; 50% of the respondents at Division A rated the initiative of today's company grade officers as "not as good". (Q1-7, Part IIIa).

13. Half (50%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's company grade officers are better in terms of professional knowledge than those of seven or eight years ago. The majority of battalion operations NCOs (63%), however, said that the officers are now less knowledgeable. Respondents in armor units were more likely than those in infantry units to report that today's officers are not as good in terms of professional knowledge (55% compared with 17%). (Q1-7, Part IIIb).

14. More than half (63%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's company grade officers are the same or better in terms of leadership than were those of seven or eight years ago. A number of respondents (37%), however, reported that "today's are not as good". Battalion operations NCOs, particularly those in armor units, often reported that "today's are not as good". (Q1-7, Part IIIc).

15. The majority (80%) of the Q1 respondents reported that today's company grade officers are as dependable or more dependable than those of seven or eight years ago. Respondents in infantry units rated the officers as being more dependable than the comparison group more often than did the respondents in armor units (42% and 27%, respectively). (Q1-7, Part IIId).

Table 5.1

Responses to Questions Concerning the Population of
Trainers and Trainees

HOW WELL DOES TODAY'S YOUNG SOLDIER
LEARN AND REMEMBER THE FOLLOWING? (Q1-9; Q2-9).

a. Individual Skills

Response Scale

Very Poorly	Poorly	Moderately Well	Very Well
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	n	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2.6
Bn S3	3	3		2	2	3	3	3	2.7
Bn Ops NCO	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2.7
Co Comdr	3	2	4	2	3	3	2	1	2.5
Co Trng NCO	2		4		1	3	1		2.2
PLT Ldr	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3.1
PLT Sgt	2	3	3	4	3	3	2	1	2.6
<u>Mean</u>	3.2	3.0	3.3	2.7	2.4	2.9	2.3	2.2	
	3.1		3.0		2.6		2.2		
<u>Mean</u>	3.1		3.0		2.6		2.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.8	2.7

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	4	13	30	4	1

b. Collective Skills

Response Scale

Very Poorly	Poorly	Moderately Well	Very Well
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	n	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2.3
Bn S3	3	3		3	2	3	3	3	2.9
Bn Ops NCO	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	2.6
Co Comdr	3	2	4	2	3	3	2	1	2.5
Co Trng NCO**	1		3		1	3	1		1.8
PLT Ldr	2	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	2.6
PLT Sgt	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	2.6
Mean	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.4	2.9	2.4	2.2	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
Mean	2.6		2.5		2.6		2.3		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.5	2.2

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	5	17	27	2	1

HOW WELL CAN TODAY'S CREW
COMMANDERS AND SQUAD LEADERS
CONDUCT SQUAD AND CREW
TRAINING? (Q1-8; Q2-8).

Response Scale

Very Poorly	Poorly	Moderately Well	Very Well
1	2	3	4

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	2	2	2	1	2	4	2	3	2.3
Bn S3	3	2		1	2	3	3	2	2.3
Bn Ops NCO	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	2.6
Co Comdr	2	1	3	4	3	3	2	3	2.8
Co Trng NCO ⁺⁺	3		4		2	2	3		2.7
PLT Ldr	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	2.7
PLT Sgt	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2.5
<u>Mean</u>	2.3	2.3	3.0	2.2	2.6	3.0	2.6	2.3	
	2.3		2.6		2.8		2.5		
<u>Mean</u>	2.3		2.6		2.8		2.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	2.6	2.5

Frequency Distribution:

	1	2	3	4	n
f	6	15	28	3	0

IN YOUR OPINION, HOW DO TODAY'S
NCOs E6-E4 COMPARE WITH THOSE OF
7 OR 8 YEARS AGO IN TERMS OF EACH
OF THE FOLLOWING? (Q1-7, Part I).

a. Initiative

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good

0

Today's are about
the same

1

Today's are
better

2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	0	0	n	2	1	1	0.9
Bn S3	1	0		0	0	0	1	0	0.3
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.3
Co Comdr	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0.5
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.3	
	0.62		0.29		0.57		0.38		
<u>Mean</u>	0.62		0.29		0.57		0.38		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	0.4

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	19	8	3	1

b. Professional knowledge

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good
0

Today's are about
the same
1

Today's are
better
2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	2	0	1	2	n	1	1	1	1.1
Bn S3	1	0		0	0	1	0	0	0.3
Bn Ops NCO	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.5
Co Comdr	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0.4
<u>Mean</u>	1.3	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.3	
<u>Mean</u>	0.8		0.7		0.6		0.3		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.7	0.4

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	17	9	4	1

c. Leadership

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	2	1	n	1	1	0	1.0
Bn S3	1	0		0	0	0	1	0	0.3
Bn Ops NCO	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.1
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	0.5
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.0	
<u>Mean</u>	0.5		0.7		0.4		0.3		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.6	0.3

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	19	8	3	1

d. Dependability

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	1	n	1	2	1	1.1
Bn S3	1	0		0	0	1	1	0	0.4
Bn Ops NCO	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.4
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	0.5
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.3	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	0.5		0.7		0.6		0.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.8	0.4

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	15	12	3	1

IN YOUR OPINION HOW DO TODAY'S NCOs
(E9-E7) COMPARE WITH THOSE OF 7 OR 8
YEARS AGO IN TERMS OF EACH OF THE
FOLLOWING? (Q1-7, Part II).

a. Initiative

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	1	n	2	2	1	1.3
Bn S3	0	1		1	0	0	1	1	0.6
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.4
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	1.3
<u>Mean</u>	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.5	
<u>Mean</u>	0.6		1.0		1.1		0.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.8	0.9

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	11	12	7	1

b. Professional knowledge

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	0	n	1	2	1	1.0
Bn S3	0	1		0	0	0	1	0	0.3
Bn Ops NCO	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.5
Co Comdr	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	0	1.4
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	1.3	1.0	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.3	0.3	
<u>Mean</u>	0.9		0.7		0.9		0.8		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.9	0.8

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	14	8	8	1

c. Leadership

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good

0

Today's are about
the same

1

Today's are
better

2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	2	n	1	2	0	1.1
Bn S3	0	1		1	0	0	1	0	0.4
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.3
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	1.3
<u>Mean</u>	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.0	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	0.6		1.1		0.9		0.5		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.7	0.8

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	14	9	7	1

d. Dependability

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good
0

Today's are about
the same
1

Today's are
better
2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	1	n	1	2	1	1.1
Bn S3	0	1		0	0	1	1	1	0.6
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0.9
Co Comdr	1	0	2	2	2	2	1	0	1.3
<u>Mean</u>	0.3	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.7	1.3	1.5	0.8	
<u>Mean</u>	0.6		1.1		1.0		1.1		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.9	1.0

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	8	15	7	1

IN YOUR OPINION, HOW DO TODAY'S
COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS COMPARE
WITH THOSE OF 7 or 8 YEARS AGO
IN TERMS OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING?
(Q1-7, Part III).

a. Initiative

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	1	n	1	2	1	1.1
Bn S3	0	1		2	2	1	1	1	1.1
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.5
Co Comdr	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	0.5
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.3	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	0.8		1.1		1.3		1.1		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.9	1.2

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	8	12	10	1

b. Professional knowledge

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good
0

Today's are about
the same
1

Today's are
better
2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	2	2	n	1	2	1	1.4
Bn S3	0	1		1	2	1	2	2	1.3
Bn Ops NCO	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.6
Co Comdr	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	1.6
<u>Mean</u>	0.5	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.8	
<u>Mean</u>	0.9		1.3		1.3		1.5		

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	8	7	15	1

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.1	1.4

c. Leadership

Response Scale

Today's are not as good	Today's are about the same	Today's are better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	0	2	n	2	2	0	1.1
Bn S3	0	1		1	2	0	1	1	0.9
Bn Ops NCO	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	
Co Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	1.4
Mean	0.3	1.0	0.7	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.0	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
Mean	1.1		1.0		2.3		1.0		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
Mean	0.8	1.1

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	11	9	10	1

d. Dependability

Response Scale

Today's are not
as good
0

Today's are about
the same
1

Today's are
better
2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde S3	0	2	1	1	n	1	2	1	1.1
Bn S3	0	1		2	1	1	1	1	1.0
Bn Ops NCO	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.9
Co Comdr	2	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	1.5
<u>Mean</u>	0.5		1.3	1.5	1.0		1.0		
<u>Mean</u>	0.9		1.4		1.1		1.1		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.9	1.3

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	6	14	10	1

Table 5.2 shows interview comments regarding the current population of trainers. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. Most (85.0%) of the G3s, brigade commanders, and battalion commanders thought that professional knowledge of today's junior officers is "better" than that of a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71a).

2. The majority (80.0%) of the respondents thought that the initiative shown by today's junior officers is the same or better than that shown by a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71b).

3. Most (85.0%) of the respondents rated the dependability of today's junior officers as equal to or better than that of a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71c).

4. The respondents were divided in their opinions regarding the leadership of today's junior officers. Some (31.6%) said that today's junior officers are better in terms of leadership than a comparable group from several years ago, but some (31.6%) of the respondents rated today's junior officers as "not as good." (I-71d).

5. The overall response indicated that the G3s, brigade commanders and battalion commanders think that the qualifications of today's junior officers are the same or better than those for a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71a, b, c, d).

6. Most (85.0%) of the respondents thought that the professional knowledge of today's NCOs is equal to or better than that of a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71e).

7. The respondents were divided in their opinion about the initiative shown by today's NCOs. Some of them (30.0%) thought that today's NCOs show more initiative than was shown by a comparable group from several years ago, but a substantial number (35.0%) said that the initiative shown by today's NCOs is not as good. (I-71f).

8. The majority (80.0%) of the respondents thought that the dependability of today's NCOs is equal to or better than that shown by a comparable group from several years ago. (I-71g).

9 Respondents were divided in their opinion regarding the leadership shown by today's NCOs. A substantial number of them (42.1%) thought that the leadership shown by today's NCOs is better than that of the comparable group from several years ago, but some (36.8%) of them thought that the leadership shown by today's NCOs is not as good. (I-71h).

10. The overall response indicated that the G3s, brigade commanders, and battalion commanders are divided in their opinions about the qualifications of today's NCOs. Some think that today's NCOs are better than those of several years ago, but some think that today's NCOs are not as good. (I-71e, f, g, h).

Table 5.2

Interview Comments Concerning the Population of
Trainers and Trainees

COMPARED WITH THOSE OF 7 OR 8 YEARS
AGO, HOW DO TODAY'S NCOs AND JUNIOR
OFFICERS RATE ON THE FOLLOWING
CHARACTERISTICS? (I-71).

a. Professional knowledge of today's junior officers

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
G3	2		2		2		2		2.0
Bde Comdr	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1.9
Bn Comdr	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	1.9
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	2.0		2.0		2.0		1.6		

b. Initiative of today's junior officers

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3	1		1		2		1		1.
Bde Comdr	1	1	2	2	1	1	0	0	1.
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	1.
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.2		1.8		1.2		0.6		
					<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>			
			Mean		1.2	1.5			

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	4	8	8	0

c. Dependability of today's junior officers

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mean</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
G3	1		1		1		2		1.2
Bde Comdr	1	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	0.9
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	1.5
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	0.5	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	
	└───┘		└───┘		└───┘		└───┘		
<u>Mean</u>	0.8		1.6		1.0		1.4		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.5	1.5

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	3	10	7	0

d. Leadership of today's junior officers

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3		1		1		1		2	1.2
Bde Comdr	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	2	1.0
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	0.8
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	1.5	2.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	2.0	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.2		0.8		0.8		1.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	0.8	0.8

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	6	7	6	1

e. Professional knowledge of today's NCO's

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3	2		0		2		2		1.5
Bde Comdr	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1.9
Bn Comdr	2	0	2	2	2	1	0	2	1.4
<u>Mean</u>	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.5	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.6		1.6		1.8		1.4		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.5	1.2

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	3	2	15	0

f. Initiative of today's NCO's

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3		2		0		2		0	1.0
Bde Comdr	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0.8
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	1.1
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	0.5	0.5	2.0	1.5	0.5	0.5	1.0	
	└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		└──────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.0		1.0		1.2		0.6		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.2	1.0

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	7	7	6	0

g. Dependability of today's NCOs

<u>Response Scale</u>		
Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	<u>Armor</u> <u>Infantry</u>		<u>Armor</u> <u>Infantry</u>		<u>Armor</u> <u>Infantry</u>		<u>Armor</u> <u>Infantry</u>		<u>Mean</u>
G3	2		0		1		2		1.2
Bde Comdr	2	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	1.0
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	1.1
<u>Mean</u>	1.5	0.5	1.5	1.5	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.5	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mean</u>	1.2		1.2		0.8		1.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	1.2

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	4	10	6	0

h. Leadership of today's NCOs

Response Scale

Not as good	Same	Better
0	1	2

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		<u>Mean</u>
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
G3		2		0		1		2	1.2
Bde Comdr	1	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	1.0
Bn Comdr	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	2.0	
<u>Mean</u>	1.2		1.0		0.8		1.2		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.0	1.0

Frequency Distribution:

	0	1	2	n
f	7	4	8	1

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Professional knowledge -- much higher.
 initiative -- same for officers, NCOs better.
 dependability -- same for officers, NCOs better.
 leadership -- same for officers, NCOs better.

Armor

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- same.
 dependability -- today's NCOs are better.
 leadership -- same.
 I spend most of my time teaching young commanders what is expected of
 them and how the job is to be done.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- better because of good training at Fort Knox.
 initiative -- same.
 dependability -- same.
 leadership -- same.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- same.
 dependability -- less today. The continuing trend of our
 society is for individuals to do their
 own thing so that being responsible for a
 group is a "burden" for the modern generation.
 leadership -- better.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- officers are a little better. but the NCOs
 I had back in 1966-1971 were better.
 We had a better NCO corps. Every squad
 leader was an E6 and had been in the Korean
 conflict, all the platoon sergeants were E7
 who had been in WWII.
 initiative -- good initiative on part of the officers,
 but a reluctance on the part of NCOs because
 it's mostly the young E5 in the E6 spot,
 and the young E6 in the E7 spot.
 dependability -- I'm pleased that they all try hard.
 leadership -- officers are okay. NCOs try but they make
 mistakes.

DIVISION B

G3 Professional knowledge -- officers are better, NCOs are not as good.
 initiative -- officers are the same, NCOs are not as good.
 dependability -- officers are about the same, NCOs are not
 as good.
 leadership -- officers are about the same, NCOs lag
 behind the personnel we had in 1964-65.

Armor

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- officers are better, NCOs are worse.
 dependability -- better.
 leadership -- as good if not better.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- both are better because it takes longer to
 make rank; there's more experience.
 initiative -- officers better.
 dependability -- same.
 leadership -- --

Infantry

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better. They are technically proficient.
 initiative -- better because the army has relaxed its
 environment so that mistakes can be made.
 dependability -- better.
 leadership -- not as good initially because of the emphasis
 on management.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- better.
 dependability -- better.
 leadership -- as good if not better.

*Bn S3 Because of the lack of quality EM/NCO's, officers are forced to do the
 major amount of the load! We are working
 longer hours to make up for this lack.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Professional knowledge -- there's been gradual improvement over the past years.
 initiative -- better than 1970-71 but getting better now.
 dependability -- same.
 leadership -- same. We have had a problem training these people upward.

Armor

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- same.
 dependability -- less dependable.
 leadership -- same.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- better.
 dependability -- better.
 leadership -- better.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- same.
 dependability -- same.
 leadership -- not quite as good, too many are oriented to do their own thing rather than contributing to the good of the unit.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- officers are technically competent, better.
 initiative -- par to below par.
 dependability -- par.
 leadership -- par to slightly below par.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Professional knowledge -- better.
 initiative -- NCOs worse.
 dependability -- more dependable.
 leadership -- better.

Armor

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- more technically proficient.
 initiative -- disappointed in current crop, but they will show more initiative once they understand that they can make a mistake.

dependability -- fair. They don't know the standards they should provide and require.

leadership -- we have taken away their opportunities to lead because we don't have the time to give them a mission and correct their mistakes. We (company and up) do it ourselves because it is easier.

Bn Comdr Professional knowledge -- officers the same, NCOs less.
initiative -- officers bother me, NCOs not a problem.
dependability -- good.
leadership -- apparently no longer a curriculum at the service schools. I spend a great deal of time on it.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Professional knowledge -- equal.
initiative -- maybe a little worse.
dependability -- equal.
leadership -- maybe better. They are in a tougher environment than we were. Experience and knowledge are ever diminishing because the middle management NCO is getting out.

Bn Comdr The good "hard product" in terms of professional skills produced by Benning is outstanding and greatly improved today -- but I was in Europe during the Vietnam War so the quality could be expected to be poorer there.

Factors Impacting on Morale and Career Intentions

Table 6 shows interview comments regarding factors which impact on morale and career intentions of military participants. These comments can be summarized as follows:

1. "Inability to see positive results of one's own efforts" was rated by the majority (80.0%) of the respondents as a serious factor affecting morale and career intentions of military personnel. Several (30%) of the respondents indicated that this factor affects officers particularly and several (23.0%) indicated that it affects NCOs particularly. Only a few (10%) of the respondents thought that other enlisted men are particularly affected by this factor. (I-85a).
2. Half (50%) of the respondents felt that too much or too little guidance has a serious effect on morale and career intentions, particularly for officers and NCOs; but half (50%) felt that it has no serious effect. Brigade and battalion commanders thought this problem less serious than did respondents at company and platoon levels. Respondents in infantry units were less inclined than those in armor units to the idea that this factor has serious effects. The majority (73.7%) of respondents at Division C and Division D reported that this factor has no serious effect while those at Divisions A and B reported that morale and career intentions are seriously affected by too much or too little guidance. (I-85b).
3. The majority (76.5%) of the respondents felt that conflicting priorities at different levels of command has serious effects on morale and career intentions, especially for officers. It was noted, however, that slightly more than half (55.6%) of the respondents at Division C rated this factor as "not serious." (I-85c).

4. More than half (64.0%) of the respondents reported that uncertainty due to frequent changes in goals and missions can have serious effects on morale and career intentions, especially for enlisted men. Brigade and battalion commanders thought this problem less serious than did respondents at company and platoon levels. Respondents at Division C were less inclined to the idea that this factor has serious effects. (I-85d).

Table 6
Interview Comments Regarding Factors Which Impact on
Morale and Career Intentions

THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CAN HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON MORALE AND CAREER INTENTIONS. HOW SERIOUS DO YOU THINK EACH OF THESE FACTORS IS FOR OFFICERS? FOR NCOs? FOR OTHER EM? (I-85).

a. Inability to see positive results of one's efforts

Response Categories

Not Serious Serious
a b

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde Comdr	b	a	b	a	b	b ²	a	n ²	b
Bn Comdr	b ³	n	b ^{1,2}	n	b ^{1,2}	n	a	a	b
Co Comdr	b	b ¹	b ¹	b ¹	b ^{2,3}	b ^{2,3}	n	b ²	b ^{1,2}
Plt Ldr	b	b	b ¹	b ^{1,2}	b	b ¹	b	b	b ¹
Plt Sgt	n	n	a	n	b	n	b ¹	n	--
<u>Mode</u>	b	--	b ¹	--	b	b	--	--	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mode</u>	b		b ¹		b ²		b		

Mode Armor Infantry
b¹ b¹

Frequency Distribution:

	Not Serious	Serious	No Answer
f	6	24	10

¹Affects officers particularly

²Affects NCOs particularly

³Affects EM particularly

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr Extremely serious, especially to the guy in charge, but it affects everyone in proportion to commitment.

Bn Comdr More of an adverse effect for EM.

Co Comdr Equal for all ranks-devastating. It seems like you work and work with no results, especially in an Armored unit; maintenance time is what breaks a tank unit.

Plt Ldr Everyone wants to see positive results.

Plt Sgt It is noticed when they do a bad job.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Not a problem.

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr Serious problem for officers--you come out as a hard charger; you know what it's supposed to be like and you start beating your head against the wall.

Plt Ldr Very important for officers, NCOs and EM.

Plt Sgt --

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects both officers and EM including NCOs.

Bn Comdr More true for officers and NCOs than EM but all want to see positive results.

Co Comdr Inversely related to rank--the EMs get buried in the minutia and seldom get to see the results of the efforts.

Plt Ldr Its awfully frustrating. I was an enlisted man, went to OCS and became an officer because I loved the Army. But the Army hasn't turned out the way I wanted. The volunteer Army is not able to draw the desired number of people. Right now, I can't figure it all out to see if it's all worth the trouble.

Plt Sgt No problem.

Infantry

Bde Comdr If we do it right, we are going to see tangible results.

Bn Comdr There must be a negative effect if you can't see any positive results.

Co Comdr The young lieutenants are affected most. Instead of the tactics and leadership opportunities he looked forward to, he finds that all action takes place at company and higher. He doesn't have any opportunity to think; his job is mainly to relay the orders.

Plt Ldr It's serious for officers and some NCOs. Not too serious for EM.

Plt Sgt It's a problem.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr This is a most important problem.

Bn Comdr It's a problem for officers and NCOs because the personnel turnover never allows them to see the end product--they are always looking at new people.

Co Comdr No problem for officers--they expect it. More of a problem for NCOs and other EM.

Plt Ldr Serious problem for all ranks.

Plt Sgt It affects all ranks.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Significant to squad leader

Bn Comdr If a soldier is successful, he will stick around. If he is frustrated somewhere along the line, I don't think you can pinpoint which factor is going to make the difference. The probable reason for a soldier's getting out is that he is not cut out to be a soldier.

Co Comdr No problem for officers. Some problem for NCOs and more of a problem for other EM.

Plt Ldr Tends to make officers want to get out.

Plt Sgt --

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr Not really a problem.

Bn Comdr No problem--I think they can see the results of their efforts.

Co Comdr --

Plt Ldr A definite adverse effect at all ranks.

Plt Sgt Affects officers more than NCO.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Affects the NCOs the most. The officers have a slightly broader view and can see more improvement.

Bn Comdr Has some effect.

Co Comdr Affects officers most because they get frustrated trying to get people to do what they are supposed to do.

Plt Ldr It bothers everybody.

Plt Sgt The main thing is that the shortage of personnel keeps people from being able to see positive results.

b. Too much or too little guidance

Response Categories

Not Serious Serious

a

b

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde Comdr	a ^{1,2}	b ²	b ¹	a	b ²	a	a	a	a
Bn Comdr	b ^{1,2}	n	a	b ¹	a	b ^{1,2}	a	a	a
Co Comdr	b ^{1,2}	b ^{1,2}	b ²	b ¹	a	a	n	b	b ^{1,2}
Plt Ldr	b ¹	b ²	b ²	n	a	a	a	a	a
Plt Sgt	b ¹	n	b ¹	a	a	a	b ²	b	b
<u>Mode</u>	b ¹	b ²	b	--	a	a	a	a	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mode</u>	b ^{1,2}		b ¹		a		a		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	b ^{1,2}	a

Frequency Distribution:

	<u>Not Serious</u>	<u>Serious</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
f	18	18	4

¹Affects officers particularly

²Affects NCOs particularly

³Affects EM particularly

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr Soldiers want guidance, but supervisors (NCO and officers) get miffed when they get too much.

Bn Comdr Too much guidance affects officers and NCOs a little.

Co Comdr Too much guidance stifles initiative in officers and NCOs.

Plt Ldr Affects officers more than NCOs or other EM.

Plt Sgt Affects the morale of officers -- too much pressure, There's too little initiative on the part of NCOs.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Too much guidance affects NCOs more than it affects officers or other EM.

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr Too much guidance affects officers and some NCOs.

Plt Ldr It stifles initiative--affects NCOs more than it does officers.

Plt Sgt --

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr Too much guidance affects officers.

Bn Comdr We have to watch this, but also the experience of the person is the key.

Co Comdr Too much guidance hurts the NCOs worst because too much authority has been taken from them. Too little guidance hurts other EM because they are not told what is expected of them and later are "chewed out" for their efforts.

Plt Ldr If I receive too much guidance, then my superior does not need me.

Plt Sgt Bother officers more--no problem for EM.

Infantry

Bde Comdr A good commander knows his people and modifies his method of operation based on the personality of the command. People don't get out of the Army because of too much guidance.

Bn Comdr	The company commander is the person bothered most by too much guidance.
Co Comdr	Bothers company commanders more, but it does the most harm to E5s and E6s because it usurps the thinking process for the NCOs--they will become indifferent, ignorant and untrained.
Plt Ldr	It depends on the person--Some it hurts, some it doesn't.
Plt Sgt	It isn't a problem in this unit.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr	Can hurt NCOs.
Bn Comdr	No problem.
Co Comdr	Not too much of a problem.
Plt Ldr	Not a problem.
Plt Sgt	No problem.

Infantry

Bde Comdr	Not a problem here.
Bn Comdr	I'm sure we always give them too much guidance. It affects junior officers and NCOs.
Co Comdr	Too much is too much, but not much problem.
Plt Ldr	The current NCOs need a lot of guidance, but otherwise, it's not a problem here.
Plt Sgt	Some people require more guidance than others.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr	Too little guidance affects NCOs more than anything else because they are not told specifically enough what the desired product is to be.
Bn Comdr	No problem.
Co Comdr	--
Plt Ldr	Not too much effect.
Plt Sgt	It affects some of the NCOs.

Infantry

Bde Comdr There is too little guidance for EM in the SQT area--need more classes in order to pass.

Bn Comdr Guidance requirements vary for different events--the NCOs probably feel there is too much guidance for simple subjects like EIB test. However, when they get into the field for a large maneuver they usually feel inadequately informed.

Co Comdr Affects all ranks.

Plt Ldr Bothers everybody.

Plt Sgt Yes, there is too much guidance. All they need to do is write down "plt leader's time" of the training scheduled, and we could set the standards and ask for the evaluation. We followed this procedure at another post and we ended up with the best rifle company in FORSCOM that year.

c. Conflicting priorities at different levels of command

Response Categories

Not Serious	Serious
a	b

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde Comdr	b ¹	a	b ¹	b ³	b	a	n	b ¹	b ¹
Bn Comdr	n	b	b	b ^{1,2}	b ¹	a	a	n	b
Co Comdr	b ¹	a	b ^{1,2}	b ²	a	a	n	b	b
Plt Ldr	b	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	b
Plt Sgt	<u>b</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>b¹</u>	<u>b³</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>
<u>Mode</u>	b	--	b	b	b	a	--	b	
	└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		└────────┘		
<u>Mode</u>	b		b ¹		a		b		

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects commanders more than troops.

Bn Comdr Doesn't affect morale and career intentions, but it impacts on their perspective on things.

Co Comdr The uncertainty due to such conflicts affects officers and has secondary effect on NCOs.

Plt Ldr That's a big one there--affects officers especially and NCOs next.

Plt Sgt Affects everybody.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Not a problem here.

Bn Comdr We do not have a clear set of priorities in the Army.

Co Comdr Although frustrating, it doesn't affect career intentions because it's really one leader against another.

Plt Ldr Very great effect at all ranks-unsure of the real needs.

Plt Sgt --

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects officer level.

Bn Comdr Has an adverse effect, especially when we have too many things to get done within a fixed period of time.

Co Comdr Affects officers most and then NCOs--I can't play a game in which the rules are constantly changing.

Plt Ldr That's a touchy one--when subordinates are forced to make their own decisions as to which priority is the "real No. 1," we risk the harmony of a good unit.

Plt Sgt Bothers company level as they should determine training priorities.

Infantry

Bde Comdr It impacts most on the young soldier.

Bn Comdr It is a way of life and we must get used to it. It would aggravate the junior leaders most.

Co Comdr We have this continually and it bothers the platoon sgts most.

Plt Ldr Very discouraging across the board.

Plt Sgt It's a real problem for the EM.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects everyone.

Bn Comdr It bugs me most of all and it bothers my company commanders.

Co Comdr Not really too much of a problem.

Plt Ldr Problem at all ranks.

Plt Sgt A problem.

Infantry

Bde Comdr No problem.

Bn Comdr No real problem.

Co Comdr No problem.

Plt Ldr --

Plt Sgt Sometimes it happens that we end up with more to do than we have time to accomplish.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr --

Bn Comdr No problem.

Co Comdr --

Plt Ldr Affects all ranks--and what comes down to us, we have to do.

Plt Sgt Serious problem.

Infantry

Bde Comdr It is having too many priorities that has affected all levels of command. Since all things can't be done, it often happens that the lower levels of command--the company commanders, the ones with the least experience--are the ones who have to decide the events to be done.

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr Here maintenance is emphasised by the division commander and perhaps training by the brigade commander. It sort of develops into a very touchy situation.

Plt Ldr Definitely affects all ranks.

Plt Sgt Always! Each echelon has its own priority which is added to those of the superiors. People who learn to like the Army and would prefer to stay in don't like the way the system is currently being run, so they get out.

d. Uncertainty due to frequent changes in goals and missions

Response Categories

Not Serious Serious
a b

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde Comdr	b	a	n ³	n	a	a	n	n	a
Bn Comdr	a	b ²	b	n	a	a	a	n	a
Co Comdr	b	b	n	n	n	b ³	b	a	b
Plt Ldr	n	n	b ³	n	b ³	n	n	b	b
Plt Sgt	<u>b</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>b^{1,3}</u>	<u>b²</u>	<u>b³</u>	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>b</u>	b
<u>Mode</u>	b	--	b ³	--	--	a	--	--	
<u>Mode</u>	b		b ³		a		b		
			</						

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects everyone.

Bn Comdr No problem.

Co Comdr That is our biggest problem for all ranks. They know things are going to change tomorrow anyway, so why bother doing it today? For example, I have a platoon down in Q service and they had to stop what they were doing and come up here to be interviewed by you folks. I am sure you made arrangements in advance, but we knew nothing about it until this morning.

Plt Ldr --

Plt Sgt Affects all ranks.

Infantry

Bde Comdr No problem

Bn Comdr I see a lot of good E6s who are getting out of the Army because their wife is "fed up." They are tired of being levied, tired of uprooting the family and moving, reluctant to go to Europe.

Co Comdr I don't like to appear uncertain--it is embarrassing to announce a policy or plan and then have to change it. This uncertainty affects everyone.

Plt Ldr Affects EM more than the others.

Plt Sgt --

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr Affects EM most

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr --

Plt Ldr It's good training for combat.

Plt Sgt Big effect on officers but bothers EM most.

Infantry

Bde Comdr	--
Bn Comdr	--
Co Comdr	--
Plt Ldr	--
Plt Sgt	Has a big effect on NCOs as they will appear stupid to their men.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr	Not a problem.
Bn Comdr	Some problem.
Co Comdr	--
Plt Ldr	Affects EM more than officers and NCOs.
Plt Sgt	Big problem for the EM

Infantry

Bde Comdr	No problem.
Bn Comdr	No problem.
Co Comdr	Problem for the EM.
Plt Ldr	--
Plt Sgt	It's OK most of the time, but sometimes it hurts. Everything turns into more work and confusion for the troops.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr	--
Bn Comdr	No problem.
Co Comdr	It bothers everybody. We try to get ready for a project or a training program, and it changes.
Plt Ldr	--
Plt Sgt	It's serious at all levels.

Infantry

Bde Comdr --

Bn Comdr --

Co Comdr --

Plt Ldr Definitely affects all levels.

Plt Sgt Change "1000" is always in effect. We can be certain each morning that some change has taken place during the night.

Programming Resources and Training Activities

Table 7 shows interview comments regarding the programming of resources and training activities. These comments can be summarized as follows:

1. Tank gunnery for armor was mentioned by the majority (75.0%) of the G3s as a factor which makes a difference in planning for the different types of elements when preparing the master training calendar. (I-95).

2. Respondents varied in their reports of how much freedom they have to decide the training their units need and then seeing that it is carried out. A number (40.6%) of the respondents said that they had little such freedom, but a substantial number (34.4%) reported that they experienced total freedom in this regard. (I-45).

3. More freedom was reported at brigade and battalion levels than at company and platoon levels: 56.3% of the brigade and battalion commanders indicated that they have total freedom to decide the training their units need and then to see that it is carried out. In contrast, 68.7% of the company commanders and platoon leaders reported that they have very little such freedom. (I-45).

4. There were differences among divisions in the amount of reported freedom which respondents at different echelons exercise in deciding what training the units need and then seeing that it is carried out. At Division C, the majority (75.0%) of the respondents reported that they have total freedom; at Division B, a substantial number (37.5%) indicated total freedom; at Division D, only 25.0% reported that they have total freedom; and at Division A, none (0.0%) of the respondents reported having total freedom to decide what training their units need and then to see that it is carried out. (I-45).

Table 7

Interview Comments Regarding the Programming of
Resources and Training Activities

- . IN PREPARING YOUR ORGANIZATION'S
MASTER TRAINING CALENDAR, HOW DO
THE PLANNING FACTORS DIFFER FOR
THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF MANEUVER
ARMS ELEMENTS? (I-95).

Response Categories

Armor Needs Tank Gunnery

a

Leave it to the Bn Comdr

b

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺	
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry
G3	a		a		a		b	

Comments:

DIVISION A

- G3 No difference. They all fit fine. We have to conduct tank
gunnery with tank Bn, but it works OK.

DIVISION B

- G3 Doesn't affect allocation of time, but we must provide armor
time for gunnery/service practice, etc. But there is no
difference in the amount of training time allocated.

DIVISION C⁺

- G3 During the Green cycle there isn't. We train combined arms.
The Amber cycle is pure unit training. They all have the
same amount of time but sometimes we have to program the tank
Bns to take advantage of the available ranges. Tank gunnery
is year around training.

DIVISION D⁺

- G3 We program our resources in accordance with the type of unit
being trained. Other than that we leave it up to the unit
(BN CO). He takes what we can allocate to him and he sets the
training objectives. The Bde CO monitors and establishes
priorities when necessary.

HOW MUCH FREEDOM DO YOU HAVE TO
DECIDE THE TRAINING YOUR UNIT
NEEDS AND THEN SEE THAT IT IS
CARRIED OUT? (I-45).

Response Scale

Little Freedom	Reasonable Amount	Total Freedom
1	2	3

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mean
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bde Comdr	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	2.6
Bn Comdr	1	2	1	3	3	3	2	3	2.3
Co Comdr	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	1.5
Plt Ldr	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1.4
<u>Mean</u>	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.3	3.0	2.3	1.5	2.0	
<u>Mean</u>	1.5		1.9		2.6		1.7		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mean</u>	1.9	2.0

Frequency Distribution:

	Little Freedom	Reasonable Freedom	Total Freedom	n
f	13	8	11	0

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr 75% of the time as long as I am aligned with the superior. The other 25% are support type missions. I exercise this freedom totally.

Bn Comdr We get a lot of guidance.

Co Comdr I have to schedule training that is appropriate to the cycle. I don't have the time to do the training.

PLT Ldr A reasonable amount. But the PT placed on us by brigade takes an awful lot of time. We are required to have 70% qualified at the test time but it takes almost every day to get them qualified.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Almost total, within resource constraints. About two-thirds of the time I get everything I need to do what I want.

Bn Comdr Next quarter I have the freedom of two of the three months in all. My guidance is based on ARTEP deficiencies; what the NCO's tell me; what the company commanders say they need.

Co Comdr Before all the changes I thought I had a lot of freedom. Although I had to make paper changes, I expect to keep my training the same.

PLT Ldr I don't have much time to train my platoon.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr All that could be expected. I have complete authority to train--within guidance, of course, coming from above.

Bn Comdr The overall scheme is dictated by higher HQ (e.g., we would train at small unit level).

Co Comdr Not very much; it's fairly restrictive. I get told when I can go to the field and even though I decide what to do, it is still subject to approval of higher HQ.

PLT Ldr Only when I'm on a field exercise in which we are specifically slated to be Crew/Platoon level training.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Total. We establish the objectives, provide resources, coach and evaluate. We do have some constraints, but these are usually those things imposed on the Division Commander that are not in the SQT or ARTEP.

Bn Comdr Within the constraints placed on me by higher HQ. I take all the requirements and construct a 365 day "pie".

Co Comdr Ample freedom within the guidance given.

PLT Ldr Very little. When I do get any time it's during an FTX.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr Total.

Bn Comdr Almost total. I decentralize.

Co Comdr Most of the training that can be scheduled is the idea of the company commander. He provides necessary guidance. But freedom to decide on the training just isn't enough when you consider other non-training requirements.

PLT Ldr A great deal of input. The company commander talks to us to find out what we think needs to be done.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Maximum. Division gives a master training program which includes joint readiness exercises. I pass that flexibility down to the battalion commander. I publish an annual training plan and provide specific guidance.

Bn Comdr 90 to 100%. I more or less coordinate with company commander to see what we both want done. I can freeze a program relatively solid for about 3 months.

Co Comdr In the past we haven't had sufficient time, but I think it will be better. I try to get my people into the field. But medical and administrative requirements have priorities over tactical training.

PLT Ldr Platoon level training is lacking because of requirements for other projects. Don't have time to exercise. We seldom train separately.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr I am an arbitrator of resources between division and my battalions. I give guidance, set standards, observe and have veto power. I give my battalion commanders complete leeway within the constraints of POL, money, and time to come up with their own training program.

Bn Comdr My freedom is basically restricted by time and resources. I plan. The commanders execute.

Co Comdr I have very little freedom in deciding. I have to cheat to get in anything I think the company needs. We have too many tasks which are non-training oriented. A great effort has been made to unburden the company commander of administrative tasks. But it hasn't helped because now the administrator tells the trainer when he wants my men--in other words, my job as trainer is secondary.

PLT Ldr Most of the time we are told what to do. There isn't much time for platoon level training. I don't remember the last time I was in the field with my platoon.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Almost complete in determining the type of training needed. The competition for training areas is the restriction. I decentralize down to the battalions and review their programs semi-annually.

Bn Comdr Total, but what we say we are going to do and what we carry out are two very different things. We do a lot of things we hadn't planned (which) take away the officers and key NCO's needed to train. We project a year in advance, yet a month before the planned events these unscheduled events knock the slats out.

Co Comdr I have about 25% freedom. Normally the S3 tell us of the next week's requirements (for the battalion) and our share. Then we work our training around these requirements.

PLT Ldr Due to the number of outside tasks and lack of priorities, even my total freedom doesn't help that much.

Establishment of Training Priorities

Table 8 shows interview comments regarding training priorities. These responses can be summarized as follows:

1. None of the G3s who were interviewed cited a specific means or procedure for establishing priorities between training and non-training missions. The majority (75%) of them made general statements in this respect referencing the cycle system for programming activities, decentralization in training, and the fact that training should be the first priority. (I-49).

2. All (100%) of the G3s and brigade commanders who were interviewed said that their subordinate units do indeed feel that often there are more requirements laid on them than they can handle. They said that when this happens they are informed by the subordinate commanders or that they are able to see it for themselves. (I-68).

3. The G3s and brigade commanders said that when subordinate units report that they have more requirements laid on them than they can handle there are three kinds of response that can be made: they can sympathize but not alter the requirements; they can help the units set priorities; or they can reduce the burden. Reducing the burden was the alternative cited least often: only 33.3% of the respondents mentioned this possibility. (I-68).

4. Brigade, battalion, and company commanders indicated a variety of means for coping when they find it is impossible to meet all the requirements laid on them by higher headquarters. A substantial number of them (39.1%) said that they are forced to ignore some of the requirements. A few of them (17.4%) said that they do all the requirements but do them less well than would be desired. Nearly half (47.8%) of the respondents, however, indicated that they request relief from higher headquarters when they find that more requirements have been laid on them than can be efficiently met. (I-70).

Table 8

Interview Comments Regarding Establishment of Training Priorities

HOW DO YOU ESTABLISH PRIORITIES BETWEEN TRAINING AND NON-TRAINING MISSIONS? HOW DO THESE PRIORITIES AFFECT ASSIGNMENT OF TRAINING TIME, RESOURCES, AND SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE UNITS? (I-49).

Response Categories

Using Cycle or Blocking System a	Decentralize Training But Maintain Central Control of Resources b	Drop Out Training to Accommodate Distractors c
---	--	---

Individual Responses:

	Division A Armor Infantry	Division B Armor Infantry	Division C ⁺ Armor Infantry	Division D ⁺ Armor Infantry
G3	a	a	b	c

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 No real problem. This Division has been blocked or fenced. We are able to follow the master training calendar. FORSCOM doesn't press us with extra missions.

Armor

*Bn S3 I think we lose sight of what our real mission is. I know some of these outside requirements are important, but there are so many.

DIVISION B

G3 We establish intensified training periods of 12 weeks in duration. We do not use the red-amber-green system. We allocate alternate 12-week periods of prime time and support. The support brigade can accomplish some training during the period.

*Bde S3 We have four missions: 1) to conduct tests, 2) to act as replacement center for Europe, 3) to support reserve component training, and a distant 4) to become combat ready.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Decentralization has been the hallmark of our training. But resources must be centrally controlled--time/resources drive the results you achieve. Training is our most important requirement. We assign on a unit basis and rotate their involvement. We get some benefit out of the so-called detractors.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 I wish we could re-establish training as our number one goal. There are too many obstacles, too many distractors. When distractors come in we drop out training to accommodate them.

* This individual volunteered this information in the course of answering other interview questions.

DO YOUR SUBORDINATE UNITS VERY OFTEN
FEEL THERE ARE MORE REQUIREMENTS LAID
ON THEM THAN THEY CAN HANDLE? HOW DO
YOU FIND OUT? WHAT DO YOU DO? (I-68).

Response Categories

Sympathize	Help them Set Priorities	Reduce the Burden
a	b	c

Individual Responses:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Mod
G3	a		b		a,c		c		--
Bde Comdr	b,c	b	a	b	a,c	b	b	a	b

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	c	n
f	5	6	4	0

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 Sure they do. I find out by talking with the S3 daily.
I sympathize.

Armor

Bde Comdr Of course. They tell me or I go out to find out. I try to take the load off their backs, to align their priorities so they understand them and can see which priorities I don't really care about. I go back to my higher HQ and tell them what I am not going to do. If they want me to do them, the general will tell me to do them--which he never has.

Infantry

Bde Comdr I am sure they do. It's a natural problem. The company commanders continue to identify things that they would like to do and try to include them in an already full program. We try to counsel him and show him how to set priorities.

DIVISION B

G3 Yes, they do. I find out through the chain command. We try to keep the training requirements as top priority.

Armor

Bde Comdr I think they feel the training schedule is turbulent and, at times, feel overcommitted. They tell me or I see it. But I don't feel that they are as overcommitted as they do. I try to weigh one requirement against the other and try to balance the requirements.

*Bde S3 We try to pick those units that are scheduled to do the more meaningful training and "protect" them and we eliminate the efforts that are less productive--a matter of adjusting your priorities.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Yes, they do. They are required to analyze the Division Training Program and I ask them for their perception of the way the plan impacts on them.

* This individual volunteered this information in the course of answering other interview questions.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 Yes, they do. I find out through the chain of command and try to level out the requirements. But, if they are in red cycle, it's too bad.

Armor

Bde Comdr Yes, they do. They tell me. Sometimes I jam it back down their throat, sometimes I go back to higher headquarters and request relief.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Yes, they tell me. If they need a priority set, I set the priority.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Yes I find out through the chain of command. I reassess the taskings and balance them out, coordinate overall taskings with corps, minimize those requirements that detract from training. We use the XYZ program of allocating time and tasks.

Armor

Bde Comdr Yes. The division commander says he is not going to set priorities--everything is important. The commanders in their frustration tell me. At my level down I have to set priorities to help the youngsters who do not have the experience or the staff to know what to do.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Yes. I find out by talking with the young officers and NCOs who feel frustrated because they are never doing any one thing well. They are rushing from one project to another. I counsel them and stress that they must get the most out of every opportunity.

- . WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU FIND IT
IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET ALL THE
REQUIREMENTS LAID ON YOU BY HIGHER
HEADQUARTERS? (I-70)

Response Categories

No Problem	Ignore Some Requirements	Do All Less Well	Request Relief
a	b	c	d

Individual Responses:

	<u>Division A</u>		<u>Division B</u>		<u>Division C⁺</u>		<u>Division D⁺</u>		<u>Mode</u>
	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	
Bde Comdr	b	d	d	a	d	b	d	c,d	d
Bn Comdr	c	b	d	b	d	d	b	c	b,d
Co Comdr	c	b	b,d	d	b	d	n	b	b
<u>Mode</u>	-	-	d	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>Mode</u>	b		d		d		-		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	b,d	b

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	c	d	n
f	1	9	4	11	1

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bde Comdr Refuse to do the requirements.

Bn Comdr When it is difficult to do a lot of things "well" you do some of them "mediocre". What I do is place emphasis on things with priority. This emphasis normally comes down from higher headquarters.

Co Comdr I really do everything half-assed. I tried to get my superiors to set priorities but they keep everything top priority. So I set my own priorities and try to meet them, but it's tough.

Infantry

Bde Comdr We don't have that problem. We have a quarterly briefing in which each battalion presents a briefing to the assistant division commander. All company commanders are present. We present on a day-by-day basis the training scheduled for the next quarter to include areas to be used and support required. We try our best to screw it down for the whole next quarter. We try very hard not to change it.

Bn Comdr Ignore them and establish my own priorities. I find they don't check enough to catch me anyway.

Co Comdr Set priorities on what I think needs to be accomplished--you just have to let certain things fly out the window.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bde Comdr I go back and see the G3 and then, if necessary, the assistant division commander. But I can only recall one case when I had to go back to get relief from the requirement.

Bn Comdr I try to work through the staff chain--let them work things out. If that doesn't work, I go see the brigade commander.

Co Comdr I find that lots of times I can reduce the requirement when I analyze what the job is--e.g., they will ask for ten men to rake leaves when there are only two rakes. When I am swamped I offer my proof and ask for relief.

Infantry

Bde Comdr I find none as yet. I do find tasks that are not normally expected of a TO&E unit.

Bn Comdr It's a simple matter of prioritizing--Quite honestly, this is one of the biggest problems the company commanders have--that is, determining what the real priority is.

Co Comdr I only had this happen once about 6 months ago. I went to my next higher headquarters and asked for relief and I got what I wanted.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr Go back and tell my boss I can't do them all.

Bn Comdr Go to the brigade commander.

Co Comdr I do what everybody does--I bitch about it. I have to set priorities.

Infantry

Bde Comdr Do those things that have to be done and try to do them right.

Bn Comdr Go to the brigade commander.

Co Comdr They are pretty good about adjusting.

DIVISION D⁺

Armor

Bde Comdr When I feel that the requirements are interfering with the unit I go back to division about it.

Bn Comdr The commanding general picks the things he wants for the day, the brigade commander picks his, and I pick mine. You just have to be selective and do what you think best.

Co Comdr --

Infantry

Bde Comdr

I inform higher headquarters. If the issue is a major one, I ask for priorities; if it is routine, I dilute the effort on other projects to include the added requirement.

Bn Comdr

We do them all. We pride ourselves on our ability to get the jobs done regardless of the number.

Co Comdr

It's just "crisis" management. I determine that which is most important out of it all and go about doing that.

Availability, Selection, and Training of Training Support Personnel

Table 9 shows interview comments regarding the availability and selection of training support personnel. These comments can be summarized as follows:

1. G3s at two of the four installations surveyed indicated that their divisions have a training cadre to assist units in conducting training. Division B's cadre is "not permanent" but has about 40 people "earmarked" to be tasked as required. Division D's cadre is "minimal" consisting of 3 people. (I-0).

2. At none of the four installations surveyed did the G3 report that the division has an evaluation section to conduct evaluations of training, although the G3 at Division D indicated that officers and NCOs assigned to the G3 section are available to perform this function. (I-1).

3. Although none of the divisions surveyed had an evaluation section, two respondents (a battalion S3 at Division A and a squad leader at Division C) expressed a specific need for such a cadre. (I-1).

4. None of the battalion commanders or company commanders who were interviewed thought that the type unit they have makes it unusually in demand for supporting the training of other units, although half (50.0%) of them commented that they are in demand for the tactical support of others. (I-46).

Table 9

Interview Comments Regarding the Availability
Of Training Support Personnel

- . DO YOU HAVE A TRAINING CADRE TO
ASSIST UNITS IN CONDUCTING TRAINING?
IF SO, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE IN IT? (I-O).

Response Scale

Yes, But not Permanent	Yes, But Minimal	No
a	b	c

Individual Responses:

	Division A Armor Infantry	Division B Armor Infantry	Division C ⁺ Armor Infantry	Division D ⁺ Armor Infantry
G3	c	a	c	b

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 No.

DIVISION B

G3 Yes, but it is not permanent. It is tasked for as required. About 40 people from the total division are earmarked by individuals, not position. We do pay a price when they are absent from their primary job.

DIVISION C⁺

G3 No.

DIVISION D⁺

G3 Very minimal. We have 3 people now. This is very unsatisfactory. We need more people to establish a division standardization program in so far as training in concerned.

- . DO YOU HAVE AN EVALUATION SECTION
TO CONDUCT EVALUATIONS OF TRAINING
IN YOUR ORGANIZATION? (I-1).

Response Scale

Not Specifically	No
a	b

Individual Responses:

	Division A	Division B	Division C ⁺	Division D ⁺
	Armor Infantry	Armor Infantry	Armor Infantry	Armor Infantry
G3	b	b	b	a

Comments:

DIVISION A

G3 No.

Infantry

*Bde S3

I will train a small task force in the brigade to
evaluate ARTEPs. Cadres should be "professional"
with no other duties than to administer ARTEP.

DIVISION B

G3 No.

DIVISION C⁺

G3

No.

Infantry

*Sqd Ldr

I think someone who knows what they are doing should evaluate us--a special team.

DIVISION D⁺

G3

We do not have a specific section, but the officers and NCOs assigned to the G3 section are available to perform this function.

* This individual volunteered this information in the course of answering other interview questions.

- . DOES THE TYPE UNIT YOU HAVE MAKE
IT UNUSUALLY IN DEMAND FOR SUPPORTING
THE TRAINING OF OTHER UNITS? (I-46).

Response Scale

No	No, But We Have to Replace Those (e.g., Engineer) That Are on Support Details	No, Except as Tactical Support To Others
a	b	c

Individual Response:

	Division A		Division B		Division C ⁺		Division D ⁺		Mode
	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	Armor	Infantry	
Bn Comdr	a	c	c	a	c	c	a	a	a,c
Co Comdr	a	b	a	c	c	c	n	c	c
<u>Mode</u>	-		-		c		-		

	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
<u>Mode</u>	a	c

Frequency Distribution:

	a	b	c	n
f	6	1	8	1

Comments:

DIVISION A

Armor

Bn Comdr No.

Co Comdr No.

Infantry

Bn Comdr No, we have supported other units on ARTEPs but that's tactical training.

Co Comdr No, but we have to replace the engineers or military intelligence for many support details.

DIVISION B

Armor

Bn Comdr No, we have a normal task organization where we trade with the infantry battalion to train in combined arms.

Co Comdr No.

Infantry

Bn Comdr No.

Co Comdr There are many support requirements that take a lot of my time in support of others but unfortunately that is not unusual because of my type of unit.

DIVISION C⁺

Armor

Bn Comdr We are not making any demands on anybody but our two tank battalions are getting demands placed on them.

Co Comdr No more than necessary to help the infantry battalion.

Infantry

Bn Comdr No, we support the ranger battalion considerably which is used as an OPFOR.

Co Comdr No, I do support the ranger battalion because they have a higher priority.

zone

BENTHONIC ZONE
CONVERGENCE ZONE
FRESNEL ZONE
TILLOTSON ZONE
ZONE CHARGES
ZONE MEETING

ZONES

ABYSSAL ZONES
BATHYAL ZONES
BRILLIANT ZONES
DEMILITARIZED ZONES

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ZOOONOTIC DISEASES

ZOOPLANKTON

ZOOPLANKTON

GROUP WORK